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THE IMPACT OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY ON LABOR 
LAW: SOME AMERICAN COMPARISONS 
MARLEY S. WEISS* 
As the western European nations transform themselves into a single 
market and then a European Union, a comparative examination of Euro-
pean Community and American labor law developments is both valuable 
and timely. The European Economic Community is in the midst of a 
major reorganization and expansion of its spheres of competency and its 
institutional arrangements, including highly significant changes regard-
ing labor-management relations. American labor relations law, too, may 
be on the verge of important change, although the dimensions and scope 
of the change are, at this point, difficult to discern. 
The European Community, scheduled to complete its development 
from a customs union into a single market by the end of 1992, has now 
undertaken as well to become a political and economic union. European 
Union means movement to a single European currency, European citi-
zenship, increased coordination of common defense and foreign policies, 
and bolstering the democratic accountability of the European Commu-
nity's political institutions. 1 More significant for our purposes, European 
Union means an expanded European Community competence over mat-
ters of "social policy,"2 a term encompassing what Americans refer to as 
labor law, as well as other matters of social welfare policy.3 
• Associate Professor of Law, University of Maryland School of Law; B.A. 1971, Barnard 
College; J.D. 1974, Harvard Law School. The author wishes to thank Pam Connally, John Mcin-
tire, and Jon Newman for their able research assistance on this project, and to express her gratitude 
to Maria Makris-Gouvas and Ted Tomlinson, for their insightful suggestions about the manuscript. 
I. A useful summary of the provisions of the Treaty on European Union and the changes it 
will effect in the institutional, economic, and legal structure of the European Community may be 
found in PAOLO MENGOZZI, EUROPEAN CoMMUNITY LAW: FROM CoMMON MARKET TO EURo-
PEAN UNITY 295-304 (Patrick Del Duca trans., 1992). On the broad implications of the Community 
becoming a European Union, see generally Peter Ludlow, The Maastricht Treaty and the Future of 
Europe, IS WASH. Q. 119 (1992). 
2. The expanded social competence largely exempts the U.K., however. See Protocol on So-
cial Policy annexed to Treaty on European Union, reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 357-58 (1992) [hereinafter 
Protocol on Social Policy]; Agreement on Social Policy Concluded Between the Member States of 
the European Community with the Exception of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and North-
ern Ireland annexed to Protocol on Social Policy annexed to Treaty on European Union, reprinted in 
31 I.L.M. 358-60 (1992) [hereinafter Agreement on Social Policy). See generally ROGER BLANPAIN, 
LABOUR LAW AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS FOR THE EUROPEAN UNION: MAASTRICHT AND BE-
YOND: FROM A CoMMUNITY TO A UNION 31-33 (1992). 
3. Title III of the TREATY EsTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN EcONOMIC CoMMUNITY, (EEC 
TREATY] (as amended 1987), entitled "Social Policy," includes a Social Provisions chapter with 
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The pace of these developments may seem glacial to some Europe-
ans, but from the American perspective, they seem fairly breathtaking. 
Even the name of the Community has been rendered partially obsolete. 
Upon ratification of the Treaty on European Union, agreed upon at 
Maastricht by the twelve Member States on December 10, 1991, and 
signed February 7, 1992, the European Economic Community, or 
"EEC," is transformed into a European Union to be known as the Euro-
pean Community, the "EC."4 As of this writing, ten Member States-all 
but the UK and Denmark-have ratified the Maastricht Treaty.5 
The transformation from an economic to a political and social union 
is by no means assured, however. The Danish refusal to ratify the Maas-
tricht Treaty without substantive change6 is symptomatic of growing 
concerns among the citizens in several EC countries regarding the "dem-
ocratic deficit"-the limited electoral accountability of most organs of 
government in the EC structure. 7 Because the Danish objections involve 
issues such as the single currency and foreign and defense policy8-mat-
articles bearing on employment (art. 118); labor-management relations and collective bargaining 
(arts. 118, 118B); working conditions (arts. 117, 118); vocational training (art. 118); social security 
(arts. 118, 121); occupational safety and health (arts. 118, liSA); labor law (art. 118); workers' right 
of association for purposes of mutual aid and protection, including union organizing (art. 118); equal 
remuneration for equal work by men and women (art. 119); and governmentally-mandated paid 
holiday schemes (art. 120). In addition, the Social Policy Title includes a chapter establishing the 
European Social Fund, to encourage and fund vocational retraining as well as to provide interim 
assistance and resettlement allowances for workers displaced by business restructurings and rede-
ployment of operations. EEC TREATY, supra, arts. 117-21. 
4. Treaty on European Union, art. G, intro. para., A( I) (amending EEC TREATY, supra note 
3, art. I) [hereinafter EC Treaty or Maastricht Treaty). See MENGOZZI, supra note I, at 295, 297. 
The twelve Member States are Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Lux-
embourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom. EEC TREATY, supra note 3, 
art. 227. 
5. See European Union: Netherlands and Germany Ratify Maastricht, EuR. REP., INSTS. & 
POL'Y COORDINATION, Dec. 19, 1992, No. 1822. 
6. See Result of the Danish Referendum on the Ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, BuLL. 
E.C. 6-1992, pts. 1.1.1-1.1.4. 
7. The democratic deficit, problems with proposed solutions within the EC's institutional 
framework, and Maastricht Treaty developments that bear on these matters, are discussed in Lud-
low, supra note I, at 127-29, 136. The need for institutional change, including decreasing Member 
State sovereignty in favor of increased direct EC citizen representation, via the European Parlia-
ment, in EC lawmaking, is fueling a renewed debate over "deepening versus broadening" the Com-
munity. This dispute may yet derail the proposed accession of three or four additional members to 
the Community if the European Parliament refuses to give the required parliamentary assent to the 
accession treaties. See European Union: Reforms to EC Institutions Ahead of Enlargement, EuR. 
REP. INSTS. & PoL'Y COORDINATION, Jan. 27, 1993, No. 1830. On the need for EC institutional 
restructuring, and for democratic deepening to accompany widening of the Community through 
entry of additional Member States, see Commission of the European Communities, Europe and the 
Challenge of Enlargement, BULL E.C., Supp. 3/92. 
8. The agreement reached to secure a second Danish ratification vote on the Maastricht 
Treaty permitted the Danes to opt out of the treaty provisions regarding economic and monetary 
union, citizenship in the European Union, common defense, and immigration. See European Coun-
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ters apart from social policy9-it is probable that the Maastricht Treaty 
will eventually come into effect without modification to any of its provi-
sions concerning labor law.'o 
On December 11, 1992, the European Council, meeting in Edin-
burgh, reached agreement on an arrangement, in the form of a European 
Council "Decision" permitting Denmark to opt out of EC Treaty provi-
sions regarding common European defense (Section C), economic and 
monetary union (Section B), justice and immigration (Section D), and 
the concept of EC citizenship (Section A). In addition, the European 
cil, Edinburgh (Dec. ll-12, 1992), EuR. INSIGHT, Dec. 18, 1992, No. 0549 [hereinafter European 
Council]. 
9. The Danes are also concerned about EC involvement in social policy, but only for fear that 
existing Danish national standards might be lowered by EC action. Because the Danes regard the 
Agreement on Social Policy, supra note 2, as a vehicle to harmonize social standards upward 
throughout the Community, Denmark has supported that aspect of Maastricht. Denmark sought 
and obtained, as part of the Edinburgh package, a European Council Declaration which permits it to 
maintain or adopt national standards stricter than those set by the EC on matters of social policy, 
consumer protection, and the environment. See European Council, supra note 8. 
10. The Council statement asserted that these arrangements are "fully compatible with the 
Treaty, ... and ... apply exclusively to Denmark and not to other existing or acceding Member 
States .... " Key Points of EC Summit Agreement on Denmark, REUTER LIBR. REP., Dec. 12, 1992 
[hereinafter Key Points of EC Summit). Predictably, observers have reached diametrically differing 
views about whether the Danes won a significant exemption from the EC Treaty, nothing they did 
not already have, or something in between. 
In the run-up to Edinburgh, many legal experts were predicting that the drafters in the 
Foreign Affairs Office had set themselves a mission impossible. Either they made real 
changes to the Treaty, in which case it would need re-ratification (which had been ruled 
out); or else they made no real changes, in which case Denmark would not be satisfied. In 
the event, the drafters have worked a miracle. They have made no real changes, while 
persuading Denmark that it has been granted a whole series of new "opt-outs." As one 
spokesman for the anti-Maastricht "June" movement in Copenhagen put it ... "Hans 
Christian Andersen would be amused. The Emperor has a new set of clothes." 
Noel Malcolm, Danish Opt-Out a Clever Illusion; Noel Malcolm Believes Denmark Has Gained Noth-
ing from Its Stand Against Maastricht, SUNDAY TELEGRAPH, Dec. 20, 1992, at 16. Compare, e.g., 
Edward Mortimer, Foreign Affairs: Same Deal as Before-The Danes Did Not Win New Concessions 
on Maastricht, FIN. TiMES, Jan. 27, 1993, at 18 ("In short, all that happened in Edinburgh was that 
Denmark's rights under the treaty were spelt out.") with, e.g., Lionel Barber, The Maastricht Jour-
ney Resumes: The Edinburgh Summit's Successful Conclusion Has Put the Community Back on the 
Track, FIN. TiMES, Dec. 14, 1992, at 16 ("Given the legal acrobatics involved in finding a solution, 
EC leaders strove to convince observers that they had made the Danes sweat. Yet the outcome left 
Denmark with all of its substantive demands intact."). 
The agreement took the form of a European Council Decision, rather than a Declaration, to 
satisfy the Danish insistence that their exemptions from the EC Treaty be legally binding, to support 
their holding a second ratification vote. At the same time, the use of a "Decision" met the demands 
of Germany and other states that no revision or re-ratification of the Maastricht Treaty be required. 
As a Decision of the Heads of State and Government, meeting in the framework of the European 
Council, the Decision is an international treaty, legally binding between Member States, but not a 
part of EC treaty-based law; hence, conferring no jurisdiction on the European Court of Justice and 
no enforceable rights on individual EC nationals. It is thus claimed that the Decision is binding 
under international law, but not a part of EC law. European Council, supra note 8. See also Lionel 
Barber & Hilary Barnes, The Edinburgh Summit: Legalistic Acrobatics Rescue Denmark-Maas-
tricht, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 14, 1992, at 2; Ian Davidson, The Edinburgh Summit: Treaty May Leak 
Through Loopholes-Maastricht Doubts Have Not Been Resolved, FIN. TiMES, Dec. 14, 1992, at 3. 
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Council entered into a declaration assuring Denmark that it remains free 
to maintain or adopt environmental and social policy measures more 
protective of its citizens than those required under EC laws. 11 Leaders of 
other EC Member States have expressed their expectation that ratifica-
tion of the Maastricht Treaty will now proceed expeditiously in both 
Denmark and the U.K., and have threatened, if necessary, to create a 
European Union on Maastricht-like lines without either of the laggards, 
if need be. 12 
In addition, the resolution of the social policy agenda at Maastricht 
was accomplished in a highly unusual fashion. The main Maastricht 
Treaty, creating the European Union, the single currency, and the in-
creased coordination of common defense and foreign affairs, was entered 
into by all twelve current Member States of the EEC. 13 The text of the 
Maastricht Treaty operates to amend the original 1957 Treaty of Rome, 
as amended, inter alia, by the 1986 Single European Act14• Effectively, 
these treaties operate as a constitution or articles of confederation, creat-
ing the EC institutional superstructure and governing its relations with 
the Member States and their citizens. 1s 
To amend the treaties required the concurrence of all twelve mem-
ber states. 16 The United Kingdom, however, consonant with its general 
hostility toward increased EC centralization and federation, adamantly 
insisted on preserving greater state sovereignty. At Maastricht, the U.K. 
resisted efforts to create a single EC currency as well as attempts to de-
velop a more unified social policy .J7 
Consequently, the U.K. made itself the odd-man out regarding so-
cial policy. When no agreement could be reached among the twelve 
states as to social provisions, the remaining eleven Member States en-
tered into the Agreement on Social Policy Concluded Between the Mem-
II. Key Points of EC Summit, supra note 10. 
12. See, e.g., Kohl Expects Britain, Denmark to Ratify Maastricht, REUTER LJBR. REP., Jan. 26, 
1993. 
13. EC Treaty, supra note 4, art. 227. 
14. /d. art. G, intro. para. 
IS. Opinion on the Draft Agreement Relating to the Creation of the European Economic Area 
(EEA) (op. 1/91) [1992] (CEC(CCH)) 184, 200-01 [hereinafter Opinion on EEA], discussed in 
MENGOZZI, supra note I, at 260-62 (the EEC Treaty is the "Constitutional Charter" and has "cre-
ated a new legal system for the benefit of which the Member States have limited their sovereign 
rights within even broader fields, and the subjects of which are not only Member States but also their 
nationals."). See also Case 294/83, Les Verts, Partie Ecologiste v. European Parliament, 1986 
E.C.R. 1339, 2 C.M.L.R. 343 (1987). 
16. EEC TREATY, supra note 3, art. 236 (amendments to be adopted by "common accord" 
among the representatives of the Member States, and to enter into force "after being ratified by all 
the Member States in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements." See 
MENGOZZI, supra note I, at 49-SO. 
17. See BLANPAIN, supra note 2, paras. I, 5, 6, 69. 
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ber States of the European Community With the Exception of the United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. 18 The Agreement on 
Social Policy was attached to the EC Treaty by annexation to a Protocol 
on Social Policy, which was in tum annexed to the Treaty establishing 
the European Community. 19 The Protocol, like the Treaty, and unlike 
the Agreement on Social Policy, was entered into by all twelve Member 
States.20 Under the terms of the Protocol, all of the normal EC legisla-
tive processes will apply to social legislation enacted pursuant to the So-
cial Agreement, except that the U.K. will not be bound by law so 
created, and the U.K. minister will not participate in the deliberations 
and voting of the Council of Ministers,21 whose final approval is neces-
sary before binding acts, including regulations, directives and decisions, 
are enacted under EC Treaty procedures. 22 
Consequently, the Maastricht Social Agreement, which expands the 
labor law subject matter on which EC legislation is appropriate, 23 and 
which relaxes the voting requirements for enactment of such legisla-
tion, 24 is only partially determinative of the course of proposals for labor-
related legal provisions. First, Maastricht has not yet been fully ratified, 
and possibly will never go into effect. Second, even if the Maastricht 
Treaty ultimately comes into force, the desire to maintain one homogene-
ous body of EC law will militate in favor of efforts to obtain U.K. con-
currence, proceeding through the EC organs applicable without regard to 
the Maastricht Protocol and Agreement on Social Policy.25 Particularly 
as regards prospects for future developments, any discussion of EC labor 
18. Protocol on Social Policy, supra note 2, intro. para.; Agreement on Social Policy, supra 
note 2, intro. para. See BLANPAIN, supra note 2, paras. I, 69, 160. 
19. Protocol on Social Policy, supra note 2, intro. para. 
20. /d. intro. para. ("The High Contracting Parties" enter into the Protocol, signifying assent 
by all twelve member states.); see BLAINPAIN, supra note 2, para. 68. 
21. Protocol on Social Policy, supra note 2, paras. I, 2; see BLANPAIN, supra at 2, para. 69. 
There is some doubt about the constitutionality of this peculiar process of appending to the law and 
institutions of the full community a body of law and lawmaking procedures applicable only to eleven 
of the twelve members. See id. para. 13. 
22. EC Treaty, supra note 4, arts. 148, 189, 189a, 189b, 189c. See generally MENGOZZI, supra 
note I, at 25·28. It is possible for the Commission to issue "secondary" regulations, but only on 
matters delegated by the Council. See id. at 89. 
23. Agreement on Social Policy, supra note 2, art. 2, paras. J, 3; BLANPAIN, supra note 2, paras. 
2, 70-72, 160. 
24. Agreement on Social Policy, supra note 2, art. 2, para. 2 (specifying qualified majority vot-
ing on activities in fields identified in art. 2, para. I); Protocol on Social Policy, supra note 2, para. 2 
(eliminating U.K. from unanimous voting under the Agreement on Social Policy, and eliminating 
the U.K's weighted votes from qualified majority voting, leading to a forty-four vote minimum in 
lieu of the usual fifty-four). · 
25. See BLANPAIN, supra note 2, para. 160. Britain, in tum, will be under pressure to compro-
mise, rather than to drive the eleven to proceed under the Agreement on Social Policy, lest the U.K. 
play no moderating role in developing a body of labor law to which it is likely, eventually, to have to 
subscribe. See id. paras. 6, 160. 
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law must accordingly take account of both the Treaty rules and the rules 
created under the Agreement on Social Policy.26 
The importance of European Community law goes beyond the 
eleven or twelve participating EC Member States. In 1991, the Commu-
nity concluded important treaties with European countries outside the 
EC itself. The European Economic Area Treaty (EEA) covers the seven 
non-EC, western European, industrialized countries, who are present or 
proposed members of the European Free Trade Area (EFT A): Austria, 
Finland, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland.27 A sec-
ond set of treaties, the Europe Agreements, created a status of "associ-
ate" European Community membership for Hungary, Poland, and 
Czechoslovakia. 2s 
In a different way, each of these treaties creates a half-way house to 
full membership status in the EC for these other European countries. 
They are within the free trade area for many purposes, but are subject, 
without EC-membership voting rights, to the existing body of treaty-
based law, including regulations and directives governing social policy as 
well as the single market.29 Future EC actions affecting labor law, at 
26. See BLANPAIN, supra note 2, para. 7. European commentators characterize this situation 
as creating a "two-track social Europe." See, e.g .• id. paras. 6, 160. 
27. Agreement Establishing the European Economic Area, BuLL. E. C. 5-1992, pt. 1.2.1. A 
previous draft of the EEA agreement is described in the opinion of the European Court of Justice 
holding the judicial provisions of the draft incompatible with the existing EEC Treaty. See Opinion 
on EEA, supra note 15, at 186-98. 
28. Association Agreement Between the Community and Hungary, Dec. 16, 1991, BULL. E.C. 
12-1991, pt. 1.3.2; European Parliament's Assent thereto, OJC 284, Nov. 2, 1992, BULL. E.C. 9-1992, 
pt. 1.3.11; Association Agreement Between the Community and Poland, Dec. 16, 1991, BULL. E.C. 
12-1991, pt. 1.3.2.; European Parliament's Assent thereto, OJC 284, Nov. 2, 1992, BULL. E.C. 9-
1992, pt. 1.3.11; Association Agreement with Czechoslovakia, BULL. E.C. 12-1991, pt. 1.3.2. Trade 
provisions of this agreement were provisionally implemented by an interim agreement, and have 
remained in force. However, the dissolution of Czechoslovakia into two independent states has 
placed implementation of the Association Agreement in doubt and has entailed further negotiations. 
See BULL. E.C. 9-1992, pt. 1.3.14. The European Agreements with Hungary, Poland, and Czecho-
slovakia, are described more fully in JOHN PINDER, THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND EASTERN 
EUROPE ~9-72 (1991). 
29. An "Association Agreement" is concluded with the EC pursuant to EEC TREATY, art. 238, 
to establish "an association involving reciprocal rights and obligations, common action and special 
procedures." EEC TREATY, supra note 3, art. 238. Nonmember European States customarily enter 
into an association arrangement, creating common institutional structures such as a jointly consti-
tuted council and consultative assembly in preparation for subsequently negotiating an accession 
agreement and fully joining the community. See MENGOZZI, supra note I, at 252-53; PINDER, supra 
note 28, at 63-64, 70-72. The EEA Agreement would have extended to the EFf A countries the 
EEC's body of community law regarding the free movement of goods, persons, services, and capital, 
as well as regarding competition, including the substance of pertinent EEC Treaty provisions, bind-
ing legislative enactments implementing those provisions, and related judicial interpretations predat-
ing the signing of the EEA Treaty. The EEC Court of Justice, however, reviewed a July, 1991 draft 
of the treaty, and found its provisions for judicial review by a newly-created EEA Court, and appli-
cation to EFT A states of EC law incompatible with the EEC Treaty. Opinion on EEA, supra note 
15, at 186-98. See MENGOZZI, supra note I, at 253, 259-62; see also PINDER, supra note 28, at 63-64 
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least if taken pursuant to the EC Treaty rather than under the Agree-
ment on Social Policy, may also affect the law not only of the EC Mem-
ber States but of nearly all of western and central Europe. 30 
Even where labor law developments within the EC are not binding 
on these countries, nearly all aspire to eventual full EC membership, 
hence are likely to voluntarily emulate EC labor standards much the way 
Sweden was handling its currency as though it were subject to the EC's 
monetary convergence program. 31 The EC has now opened negotiations 
for accession agreements with three EFf A countries, Austria, Finland, 
and Sweden.32 The expressed aspirations of Hungary, Poland, and the 
Czech Republic to attain full EC membership as soon as possible, have 
been acknowledged by the Community.33 The movement from state so-
cialism toward free markets in the former Soviet-block countries height-
ens the geopolitical, as well as economic significance of the new EC 
treaties. In addition, of course, globalized trade and nearly instantaneous 
international communications mean that legal and economic develop-
ments in the European Community have rapid, strong effects on there-
mainder of the world, and particularly on the United States. 
(discussing difficulties of creating and then applying new EC law to EEA and Europe Agreement 
countries which are not represented in EC institutions and are not bound by European Court of 
Justice decisions). A revised EEA Agreement was thereafter entered into on May 2, 1992. See 
BULL E.C 5-1992, pt. 1.2.1. It has been estimated that the EEA agreement extended two-thirds of 
the body of EC law to the EFT A countries. See Janet McEvoy, Arctic Farms, Neutrality Key to EC 
Membership Talks, REUTER LtBR. REP., Jan. 28, 1993. Switzerland, however, failed to ratify the 
amended treaty, throwing its status into doubt. /d. The remaining EFTA countries, together with 
the EC, nevertheless intend to go ahead with implementation of the EEA Treaty, which, unlike 
Maastricht, made provisions against the contingency of non-ratification by an EFT A member coun-
try. The remaining six EEA/EFTA member states have ratified the treaty. See European Commu-
nity: Maastricht Treaty, Single Market Concerns, Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA), No. 4, at 148. (Jan. 27, 
1993). 
30. As to the EEA, see Opinion on EEA, supra note 15, at 193-94, 198-99. The difficulties in 
applying future as well as pre-existing EC caselaw to association agreement partners, even where the 
association agreements intentionally incorporate treaty language identical to that of the EEC Treaty, 
are discussed id. at 200-02. 
31. See Vibeke Laroi, Swedish Social Democrats Avoid Issue of Joining EC, REUTER LIBR. 
REP., Jan. 19, 1993. 
32. Negotiations opened on February 2, 1993, with a goal of accession by January 1, 1995. See 
EC Aspirants Agree Agenda, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 3, 1993, at 2. These three applicants for membership 
have reiterated unequivocal commitment to all aspects of the EC Treaty, including common Euro-
pean foreign and defense policy, as well as social policy and the single market. See David Gardner, 
New Applicants to Give Up the Neutrality Habit, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 2, 1993, at 2. Norway is expected 
to join negotiations for accession later in 1993. See Christopher Follett, Danish Premier Sees Maas-
tricht "Yes" as Top Priority, REUTER LtBR. REP., Feb. 2, 1993. 
33. See Andrew Marshall & Sarah Lambert, The Edinburgh Summit: What the leaders of Eu-
rope agreed, THE INDEPENDENT, Dec. 14, 1992, at 10 ("The summiteers agreed that at the Copen-
hagen Summit in June they will set out a path for membership of the EC for eastern Europe .... "); 
Barber, supra note 10 ("Late on Friday night, Chancellor Kohl spoke expansively of a Community 
stretching eastwards to include Poland, Hungary, the Czech and Slovak Federation, and the Baltic 
states .... "). See also Pinder, supra note 28, at 1, 71-72. 
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These same factors, however, render a discussion of the impact of 
the European Community on labor law ambiguous and uncertain. First, 
when one speaks of the "impact of the EEC on labor law," there is the 
question of impact on whose labor law-that of European Community 
countries, other European countries, the United States, or other non-Eu-
ropean countries. Second, one may ask what sorts of impact we are con-
cerned with, or how the impact comes about. The topic might be 
confined to the impact of European Community labor law on labor law 
at the national level, or it might encompass the impact of the creation of 
a single economic market and other dimensions of European unification 
on labor law. These ambiguities are compounded by the unsettled status 
of European Community law generally, in light of questions about the 
ultimate ratification of the Maastricht Treaty and the many uncertainties 
regarding labor law if the Treaty becomes operative. 
In this commentary, I will concentrate on drawing some compari-
sons between European developments and analogous problems affecting 
U.S. labor relations. The most important impact of the EC on American 
labor law may well be through the trans-Atlantic influence of concepts, 
models and structures pioneered in Europe. This commentary will iden-
tify and sketch out relevant comparisons, although more detailed devel-
opment must be left for another day and time. 34 
One may profitably compare developments in the European Com-
munity with those in the United States in two different ways. First, one 
may regard the EC as a confederal system, moving toward a loose form 
of political union, and one may compare the interaction of EC level and 
community-member national level developments with the interaction of 
U.S. federal level and state level labor developments. Alternatively, one 
may think of the EC as predominantly an economic and customs union, 
and one expanding to include EFf A countries as well as several central 
European states. One may then draw comparisons to the common mar-
ket proposed under the North American Free Trade Agreement among 
Canada, Mexico and the U.S., and its potential extension, through the 
Enterprise for the Americas Initiative, throughout the Western 
Hemisphere. 
The comparison between European Community-Member State rela-
tions on the one hand, and U.S. federal-state relations on the other, must 
34. The usual admonitions apply regarding the inevitable partiality and distortion entailed in a 
comparative analysis without more contextual detail than is possible here about the institutional, 
social and political settings in which these legal rules are embedded. See, e.g., Clyde W. Summers, 
Worker Participation in the U.S. and West Germany: A Comparative Study from an American Per-
spective, 28 AM. J. COMP. L. 367, 367 (1980). 
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be taken with some caution. The European Community is closer to a 
confederation of nation-states than it is to becoming a unified federation. 
The EC starts from a base of well-developed national legal systems. In 
many areas of its competence, the EC does not exclusively occupy the 
field, but, rather, through harmonization of Member State laws, attempts 
to move the national systems towards convergence, or at least to avoid 
economically harmful clashes of state legal cultures. 35 Indeed, the most 
prevalent type of legal instrument created pursuant to the EEC Treaty is 
the directive. This instrument functionally reflects the EC's desire in 
many circumstances to "approximate" the laws of the Member States, 
reducing the policy differences while permitting the states to retain their 
diverse legal traditions by implementing EC policies in varying ways. 36 
The formal incorporation into the Maastricht Treaty of the principle 
of subsidiarity, can only reinforce the tendency to retain predominance of 
Member State legislation over EC action. "Subsidiarity" means that in 
areas subject to legislation at both the national and EC level, the EC 
should take action only when, and to the extent that, "by reason of the 
scale or effects of the proposed action, [it] can be better achieved by the 
Community," and only to the extent "necessary to achieve the objectives 
of [the] Treaty."n 
It is worthwhile to contrast U.S. and EC approaches to the persis-
tent debate on both continents over whether to enact labor legislation at 
the state or federal level. To produce uniformity of law, the EC may 
enact a "regulation," a generally and directly applicable legal instrument 
akin to a U.S. federal statute, binding in its entirety on all Member States 
and their citizens, preemptive of conflicting Member States' laws, and 
enforceable by, inter alia, Member States and their citizens against each 
other. 38 Virtually nothing in the labor or social policy field has been 
enacted in this way, however, and this is likely to persist for the foresee-
able future. Indeed, the EC Treaty does not authorize adoption of regu-
lations, but only directives, regarding most issues of social policy. 
35. See MENGOZZI, supra note 1, at 52-53. 
36. See EC Treaty, supra note 4, art. 100 (providing procedures for issuance of directives for 
approximation of Member States' laws that "directly affect the establishment or functioning of the 
common market"); id. art. lOOa(l) (providing procedures for issuance of directives for approxima-
tion of Member States' laws "which have as their object the establishment and functioning of the 
internal market"). Directives are the legal instrument of choice for "approximation" of Member 
States' laws. See infra text accompanying notes 73-74. 
37. EC Treaty, supra note 4, art. 3b. 
38. EEC TREATY, supra note 3, art. 189. EC and Member State caselaw interpreting the 
Treaty to ensure that regulations and the European Court of Justice caselaw interpreting them are 
indeed fully binding and directly enforceable in Member States is discussed in MENGOZZI, supra 
note 1, at 52-53, 76, 86-90. 
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Except for directives regarding occupational health and safety under Ar-
ticle 118a, Article lOOa, Section 2 of the EC Treaty requires that "provi-
sions relating to the rights and interests of employed persons" may only 
be adopted by unanimous vote of the Council. 39 Only by proceeding 
under the Agreement on Social Policy may the Council adopt social leg-
islation concerning matters other than occupational health by qualified 
majority voting, and even then, only through directives setting minimum 
standards which the Member States remain free to exceed.40 
To the extent that there is an exception here, it is in the area of 
rights regarding nondiscrimination on the basis of Member State nation-
ality, and in the limited sphere of equal pay, on the basis of sex. These 
rights are spelled out in the text of the EC Treaty,41 and have been held 
to be directly enforceable by citizens against each other ("horizontal di-
rect effect") as well as against state action ("vertical direct effect"). 42 In 
39. With a few exceptions, directives are the strongest form of action authorized in the social 
policy area under the EEC Treaty, whose social policy provisions were virtually unaffected by Maas-
tricht. In most instances, social policy directives must be adopted by unanimous vote. In many 
areas, only nonbinding action may be taken by the EC. In several articles the treaty calls for purely 
voluntaristic efforts, such as the obligation of the Commission to "promot[e] close cooperation be-
tween the Member States in the social field," by conducting studies, consulting with the Economic 
and Social Council, and delivering [nonbinding) opinions. Article 117 provides that "harmonization 
of social systems" will "ensue ... from the functioning of the common market;" improved living 
standards and working conditions for workers will also flow from "approximation of provisions" of 
Member State law. Article 118b exhorts the Commission to "endeavour to develop the social dia-
logue between labor and management." Article 120 requires Member States to "endeavour" to 
maintain equivalence between their paid holiday schemes. The exceptions are Article liSa, under 
which health and safety directives may be adopted by qualified majority voting, see infra text accom-
panying notes 84, 86, 97-98, 169, Article 121, relating to social security for migrant workers exercis-
ing their rights to migrate and be free of nationality-based discrimination under Articles 7 and 48-51, 
which permits adoption of regulations as well as directives to ensure removal of barriers to free 
movement of workers, infra text accompanying notes 60, 81, 85, 101-02, and Article 119, the equal 
pay for men and women provision, to the extent that it is directly applicable. Nondiscrimination on 
the basis of nationality, and in matters of pay, on the basis of sex, are discussed immediately infra 
text accompanying notes 41-43, 82-83, 92-96. 
40. The Agreement on Social Policy, supra note 2, contemplates fulfillment of its stated objec-
tives only through directives, see art. 2, para. 2, or through agreements between management and 
labor, see art. 4, para. 2 (substituting council adoption of social partner agreements for the usual 
processes of enacting directives); id. art. 2, para. 2, art. 4, para. 2 (implementing directives or substi-
tuted collective agreements through national labor-management practices and procedures). The 
EEC treaty, whose social policy provisions were virtually unaffected by Maastricht, calls for direc-
tives as the legal instrument for fulfillment of treaty policies, or for more voluntaristic efforts, such as 
the obligation of the Commission to "promot[e] close cooperation between the Member States in the 
social field," by conducting studies, consulting with the Economic and Social Council, and delivering 
''nonbinding" opinions (art. 118). 
41. Article 7 (nationality); art. 119 (gender). Article 7 is often construed together with the 
rights of "free movement of workers" under arts. 48-51, "freedom of establishment" under arts. 52-
58, and "freedom to provide services" under arts. 59-66. See generally MENGOZZI, supra note 1, at 
238-39; ROGER BLANPAIN, LABOUR LAW AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN COM-
MUNITY paras. 127-98, 218-54 (1991). 
42. See e.g., Case 188/89, A Foster & Others v. British Gas, 1990 E.C.R. 3313, 2 C.M.L.R. 833 
(1990); Case 186/87, Ian William Cowan v. Tresor Public, 1989 E.C.R. 195, 2 C.M.L.R. 613 (1989) 
HeinOnline -- 68 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 1437 1992-1993
1993) THE IMPACT OF THE EC ON LABOR LAW 1437 
addition, the proscription against nationality discrimination is enforcea-
ble by regulation as well as by directive, and a regulation has been 
adopted on the subject.43 Such "constitutionally" based equal treatment 
claims, therefore, create a fairly uniform body of substantive law applica-
ble to all workers throughout the EC. 
One may contrast this with strong policy interests favoring uniform-
ity of both substance and procedure, evident throughout much of Ameri-
can labor law, particularly that regarding collective bargaining. Strong 
labor law preemption doctrines operate to oust the states from the field 
and reserve exclusive jurisdiction for the National Labor Relations Board 
regarding union organizing, 44 the use of economic weaponry in labor dis-
putes, 45 and unfair labor practices related to collective bargaining and 
the administration of the resultant collective agreement. 46 
With the exception of statutes and common law doctrines establish-
ing legal standards for all employment, American states are also ousted 
from creating substantive law applicable to collective bargaining agree-
ments,47 and by and large are ousted of judicial jurisdiction over contract 
enforcement in favor of labor arbitration and federal court enforce-
ment.48 For historical reasons, the states played little role in collective 
(disparate treatment on the basis of EC nationality); Case 43/75, Defrenne v. Sabena, 1976 E.C.R. 
455, 2 C.M.L.R. 98 (1976) (Defrenne II) (equal pay for men and women). See generally SACHA 
PRECHAL & NOREEN BURROWS, GENDER DISCRIMINATION LAW OF THE EUROPEAN COMMU· 
NITY 27-30 (1990). The European Community term for this is "horizontal direct enforceability," to 
distinguish such rights from those enforceable only against governmental action, but not by private 
actors against other private actors, which are vertically, but not horiwntally enforceable. See gener-
ally BLANPAIN, supra note 41, at 136; PRECHAL & BURROWS, supra, at 29-30. 
43. Council Regulation 1612/68, 1968 O.J. (L257) 2, as amended by Council Regulation 2434/ 
92, 1992 O.J. (L245) I and Council Regulation 312/76, 1976 O.J. (L 39) 2. 
44. See San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959). See generally 2 THE 
DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 1660-67 (Patrick Hardin et al. eds., 3d ed. 1992). 
45. Lodge 76, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 427 U.S. 
132 (1976); see also Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103 (1989). See 
generally 2 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 44, at 1673-78. 
46. Wisconsin Dept. oflndus., Labor and Human Relations v. Gould, 475 U.S. 282 (1986). See 
also Garmon, 359 U.S. at 245-47. See generally 2 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 44, at 
1667-73. 
47. Claims asserting rights based upon or dependent upon interpretation of a collective bargain-
ing agreement must be interpreted in accordance with the federal common law of the labor agree-
ment, whether litigation takes place in state or federal court. Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 
U.S. 202 (1985); Loca1174, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962); see also 
Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399 (1988). See generally 2 THE DEVELOPING 
LABOR LAW, supra note 44, at 1698-1706. 
48. When the collective bargaining agreement provides for binding labor arbitration as the 
method of dispute resolution, courts must compel arbitration without considering the merits of the 
grievance, United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steelworkers v. 
Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); and, provided the award "draws its essence 
from the collective bargaining agreement," must enforce the resulting arbitration award without 
second-guessing the judgment of the arbitrator. United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car 
Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960); see also United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 
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labor relations before the NLRA.49 Now, their role is almost entirely 
confined to state and local public sector labor law. 
In Europe, quite the reverse is true. Collective bargaining, and 
other forms of worker representation and participation which accomplish 
functions handled in the U.S. through collective bargaining or not at all, 
developed through indigenous, diverse industrial relations systems in 
each of the twelve EC Member countries. so The attainment of EC-wide 
uniformity of labor relations systems, through EC regulation, is not even 
a long range objective; harmonization through more flexible mechanisms 
has proven an elusive goal, except in the narrow but important category 
of issues related to capital redeployment. 5 1 
Even where there is no collective bargaining, in an important second 
area of U.S. workplace governance, relations are effectively collectivized: 
the area of employee benefits. The very nature of funded or insured ben-
efit plans, even where terms are unilaterally set by the employer, requires 
that they be uniform across masses of workers, and precludes most indi-
vidual negotiation. In the United States, the federal Employee Retire-
ment Income Security Act (ERISA)52 regulates all types of private 
sector, employer-sponsored fringe benefits programs, 53 and with a limited 
29, 36 (1987). While, in theory, federal and state courts enjoy concurrent jurisdiction over suits 
interpreting collective bargaining agreements under § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 
29 U.S.C. § 185 (1988), see Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502 (1962), suits filed in 
state court are removable to federal court, see IBEW v. Hechler, 481 U.S. 851, 855-59 (1987). Fed-
eral courts therefore handle the lion's share of these cases. 
49. William E. Forbath, The Shaping of the American Labor Movement, 102 HARV. L. REv. 
1109, 1113-14 (1989); see generally WILLIAM E. FORBATH, LAW AND THE SHAPING OF THE AMER· 
ICAN LABOR MOVEMENT (1991). 
SO. The nature and extent of diversity among European Community Member States is deline-
ated in BLANPAIN, supra note 41, at 64-68; BLANPAIN, supra note 2, at 57. 
51. See generally BLANPAIN, supra note 41, at 67-68, 153-96, 204-05. While the Agreement on 
Social Policy annexed to the Maastricht Treaty would ease the barriers to labor legislation as to the 
eleven party Member States, it contemplates adoption only of directives, rather than regulations. It 
also requires that the directives "hav[e] regard to the conditions and technical rules obtaining in each 
of the Member States," Agreement on Social Policy, supra note 2, art. 2 para. 2, and that these 
measures must "take account of the diverse forms of national practices, in particular in the field of 
contractual relations .... " /d. art. 1. The most likely vehicle for creation of uniform EC-wide rules 
regarding any aspect of labor-management relations is the possibility of an EC level collective agree-
ment pursuant to Article 4 of the Agreement on Social Policy. See infra text accompanying notes 
192-93. 
52. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1988 & Supp. III 1991). 
53. Section 3 of ERISA defines "employee welfare benefit plan" as follows: 
any plan, fund, or program which was heretofore or is hereafter established or maintained 
by an employer or by an employee organization, or by both, to the extent that such plan, 
fund, or program was established or is maintained for the purpose of providing for its 
participants or their beneficiaries, through the purchase of insurance or otherwise, (A) 
medical, surgical, or hospital care or benefits, or benefits in the event of sickness, accident, 
disability, death or unemployment, or vacation benefits, apprenticeship or other training 
programs, or day care centers, scholarship funds, or prepaid legal services, or (B) any 
benefit described in Section 302(c) of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947 [29 USC 
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exception for state regulation of insurance policies, completely preempts 
all forms, direct and indirect, of state regulation. s4 Here, as with respect 
to collective bargaining, uniform federal law is viewed as essential not 
only to eliminate competition between states, but also to minimize the 
regulatory burden on multi-state employers, operating in up to fifty 
states, and to permit the employers, unilaterally or through collective 
bargaining, to develop identical national employment policies and em-
ployee benefits policies, applicable to their employees without regard to 
the state location of the operation. ss 
In EC countries, many more forms of social insurance are provided 
by the government rather than workers' employers. s6 In addition, where 
the employer provides benefits, they are often supplemental to, and inte-
grated with, the national social insurance scheme. s7 Again, this has 
made it difficult for the EC to find consensus on even minimum stan-
dards for benefits, and thoroughly precludes any uniform EC-level 
scheme any time soon. ss Only in the area of equal treatment for men and 
women have directives been issued, and even there the progress has been 
§ 186(c)] (other than pensions on retirement or death; and insurance to provide such 
pensions). 
29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (1988). In tum, § 101 of ERISA regulates reporting and disclosure regarding 
all employee benefit plans. 29 U.S.C. § 1021 (1988 & Supp. III 1991). 
54. E.g., Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41 (1987). Section 514(a) of ERISA provides, 
in part, that provisions of ERISA "shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now 
and hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan .... " 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1988). 
55. See, e.g., Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 104-06 (1983) (quoting legislative 
history). Congress wished to "ensur[e] that employers would not face 'conflicting or inconsistent 
State and local regulation of employee benefit plans.'" /d. at 104, quoting 120 CoNG. REc. 29,933 
(1974) (remarks of Sen. Williams). 
56. Article 4(1) of Council Regulation 1408/71, 1971 O.J. SPEC. Eo. (L 149) 2, regarding mul-
tistate social security claims, applies to legislation concerning any of the nine social security benefits 
categories recognized by the International Labor Organization: sickness and maternity, invalidity, 
old age, survivors', unemployment, family, benefits in respect of accidents at work and occupational 
diseases, and death grants. "Social and medical assistance" on the other hand, is excluded under 
Article 4(4). EC countries spend an average 25.6% of their GNP for social security programs. The 
proportion of social security provided by the government, out of tax revenues, as opposed to the 
proportion provided by private employer contributions and programs, varies greatly. At the ex-
tremes, the Danish government relies on tax revenues to foot the bill for 90% of the social security 
expenses, while in France, the government share is 27.8%, with private employers providing the 
remainder. BLANPAIN, supra note 41, para. 388, n.309. 
57. This has caused enormous difficulty in many of the equal pay cases, because the nondis-
crimination obligation has been held to exclude state social security schemes, but to include em-
ployer-provided benefits. 
58. There are a few limited exceptions. First, the EC has been quite successful in developing 
arrangements to ensure social insurance coverage for "migrant" workers, i.e., those whose careers 
lead them to consecutive employment in several countries. See infra text accompanying notes 60, 85. 
Second, the EC has addressed issues of sex discrimination regarding certain aspects of benefit plans. 
See infra note 59 and text accompanying notes 88-94. Third, in connection with employer insol-
vency, the EC has adopted a directive requiring Member States to ensure that workers' job loss 
benefits are guaranteed. See infra text accompanying notes 105-09. 
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mixed. 59 To support free movement of workers and to ensure nondis-
crimination based on EC nationality, the EC has legislated to coordinate, 
rather than harmonize Member States' social security provisions to per-
mit workers to aggregate their time worked in several EC countries for 
purposes of accrual and vesting of benefits. This legislation also ensures 
that those eligible may collect their social security benefits, regardless of 
where they reside within the EC at the time the benefits become 
payable.60 
On the other hand, in the United States much of equal employment 
law and virtually all individual employment rights, including the employ-
ment-at-will doctrine, and more recent tort, contract, and statutory de-
velopments in derogation of managerial prerogatives, developed first at 
state level. In these areas, there is either no broad federal legislation, 
particularly as to wrongful termination, or the legislation contemplates 
dual, overlapping federal and state regulation, as in the privacy areas 
regarding polygraphs,61 drug testing,62 and confidentiality of medical 
records.63 
At least until now, the absence of interstate uniformity has not suffi-
ciently burdened large, multistate companies to motivate them to press 
for preemptive federal legislation, nor have the state-by-state differences 
produced important competition-distorting effects. This may, in part, be 
attributable to the constraining effect the threat of business flight has on 
59. Employer-provided benefits fall within the article 119 equal pay requirement. See, e.g., 
Case 262/88, Barber v. Guardian Royal Exchange Assurance Group, 1990 E.C.R. 1889, 2 C.M.L.R. 
513 (1990); Case 170/84, Bilka-Kaufhaus GmbH v. Von Hartz, 1981 E.C.R.I607, 2 C.M.L.R. 701 
( 1986). A good discussion of the lengthy line of fringe benefit discrimination cases may be found in 
PRECHAL & BURROWS, supra note 42, at 55-77, and in BLANPAIN, supra note 41, para. 232-46. 
Governmental sex discrimination in social security programs is prohibited under the Social Security 
Directive, Council Directive 79/7, 1979 O.J. (L 6) 24; discrimination in private plans is prohibited 
under the Occupational Schemes Directive, Council Directive 86/378, 1986 O.J. (L 225) 40, 
although its protection may be inferior to that provided directly under Article 119. See PRECHAL & 
BURROWS, supra note 42, at 285-90. A proposal for a directive addressing social security matters 
excluded from the Social Security Directive and the Occupational Schemes Directive, including re-
tirement and age, family allowances, and survivor's pension has been pending since November 19, 
1987. 1987 O.J. (C 309) 10, discussed in PRECHAL & BURROWS, supra note 42, at 293-96. 
60. Council Regulation 1408/71, 1971 O.J. (L 149) 2, as amended by Council Regulation 1390/ 
81, 1981 O.J. (L 143) 1; Council Regulation 574/72, 1972 O.J. (L 74) l, as amended by Council 
Regulation 3795/81, 1981 O.J. (L 378) l, Council Regulation 2001/83, 1983 O.J. (L 230) 6, Council 
Regulation 2332/89, O.J. (L 224) l, and Council Regulation 3427/89, 1989 O.J. (L 331) l. See 
generally JOSEPHINE STEINER, TEXTBOOK ON EEC LAW 233-47 (3d ed. 1992). 
61. See Employee Polygraph Protection Act (EPPA), 29 U.S.C. § 2001-2009 (1988), particu-
larly § 10, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2009 (1988), preserving state remedies. 
62. A good description of some of the federal laws may be found in Marion Crain, Expanded 
Employee Drug-Detection Programs and the Public Good: Big Brother at the Bargaining Table, 64 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1286, 1324-30, 1335-43 (1989). 
63. See § 102(d) of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § l2112(d) (Supp. 
III 1991) (protecting confidentiality of medical records);§ 50l(b) of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 1220l(b) 
(Supp. III 1991) (preserving authority of states to enact complementary regulation). 
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state legislation. It is no accident that the most substantial derogation 
from managerial control, the erosion of the employment-at-will doctrine, 
has been crafted by state judges rather than legislators. 
By and large, in the U.S., minimum labor standards, particularly 
regarding wages and hours, are set at the federal level. 64 Many states 
copy these standards into their own legislation, sometimes with minor 
additional protections for workers and often with a separate, complemen-
tary enforcement and remedial scheme. 65 
The American approach to equal employment law has no strong 
analogue in EC law. Under Title VII66, the ADEA67, and the ADA,68 
the federal Equal Employment Opportunity Commission operates on an 
integrated basis with state agencies administering parallel state laws. So 
.long as the state agency administers a state statute providing equal or 
stronger protections against the type of discrimination addressed by the 
federal law, EEOC and the state agency will coordinate their activities 
pursuant to a work sharing-agreement, and provide the complaining 
worker with a choice of legal forum. 69 
The current EC institutional arrangements provide for private en-
forcement of directly binding EC regulation, as well as directly applica-
ble Treaty rights. Private law suits are litigated in the national courts, 
with referral to the European Court of Justice to resolve unsettled as-
pects of EC law .70 Actions brought by the European Commission or a 
Member State to enforce Treaty obligations against an EC institution or 
a Member State may be brought directly in the European Court of Jus-
tice.71 There are no EC-level administrative agencies, and in particular, 
there are none analogous to EEOC. In the current EC institutional con-
64. See Fair Labor Slandards Act, 29 U.S.C §§ 201-219 (1988 & Supp. III 1991). 
65. E.g., ARK. CoDE ANN. § 11-4-210 (Michie 1987 & Supp. 1991); CAL. LAB. CODE§ 1182 
(West 1989); D.C. CODE ANN. § 36-203 (1992). See a/so ALASKA STAT. § 23.10.065 (1990) (em-
ployer must pay employee wages not less than fifty cents an hour greater than the prevailing federal 
minimum wage). 
66. See generally§ 706(c)-(e) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c)-(e) (1988 & Supp. III 1991). 
67. Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1988 & Supp. III 1991). 
The provision providing for integration with state schemes is contained in § 14, 29 U.S.C. § 633 
(1988). 
68. 42 U.S.C. § 12101-12213 (Supp. III 1991). The provision for integration with state schemes 
is contained in § 501, 42 U.S.C. § 1220l(b) (Supp. III 1991). 
69. See generally 1 CHARLES A. SULLIVAN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION§ 11.6, at 
455-70 (2d ed. 1988); BARBARA LINDEMANN SCHLEl & PAUL GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIM-
INATION LAW 941-42 (2d ed. 1983) and 393-94 (2d ed. Supp. 1989). 
70. EEC TREATY, supra note 3, art. 177. Private parties may neither sue nor be sued in the 
Court of Justice. Such actions must be brought in national courts, which then use the Article 177 
referral procedure to refer EC Jaw questions to the Court of Justice. See STEINER, supra note 60, at 
280-81. 
71. EEC TREATY, supra note 3, arts. 169, 170, 173, 175, 184. See STEINER, supra note 60, at 
306-46. 
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figuration, nothing akin to the EEOC-state agency integrated administra-
tive scheme seems possible. 72 
The predominant instrument of EC legislation, in the labor sphere 
as in most other areas, is the directive. A directive establishes a uniform, 
EC-wide policy regarding legislative ends, but permits the Member States 
to utilize divergent means to accomplish those ends. A directive operates 
by requiring each Member State to enact its own law, unless one already 
exists, which will accomplish the policy ends specified. 73 There have 
been persistent problems with Member States failing to "transpose" di-
rectives into their national law in a timely fashion, although this foot-
dragging may cease in light of a recent Court of Justice decision holding 
Member States liable to compensate individuals who could have recov-
ered against private parties had the Member State, in a timely fashion, 
enacted legislation to implement an EC directive conferring rights upon 
the individuals. 74 
In practice, EC labor directives usually set minimum standards 
which the Member States are free to exceed. In addition, labor directives 
often either constrain the means by which the Member States may meet 
the EC-mandate or they specify a series of alternative means, at least one 
of which must be adopted. There are.many examples of American labor 
legislation which establish federal minimum standards, 75 but few require 
or even encourage state legislation for implementation. The equal em-
ployment statutes, and the Occupational Safety and Health Act, 76 per-
haps meet this exception, if one accepts encouragement in lieu of a 
federal mandate. A closer parallel may be found in the U.S. unemploy-
ment insurance system, which involves federal criteria, implemented 
72. Nevertheless, it should be noted, the EC is currently considering establishing an EC-level 
occupational health and safety agency to administer its worker health and safety directives. 1992 
O.J. (C169) 44 (Economic and Social Committee opinion regarding Commission proposal). This 
agency, however, would be more akin to the American NIOSH, rather than to OSHA; its functions 
would be scientific and advisory rather than regulatory. 
73. EEC TREATY, supra note 3, art. 189. See generally STEINER, supra note 60, at 20, 29, 37-
38. 
74. Francovich v. Italian Republic, Cases C/6 & 9/90, 1991 E.C.R. 5357 (1990), discussed in 
STEINER, supra note 60, at 283-84. 
75. The plethora of safety standards set by regulation under OSHA are obvious examples. The 
classic American labor standard is the minimum wage established under § 6(a) of the Fair Labor 
Standards Act, 29 U.S.C § 206(a) (1988 & Supp. III 1991). The most recent example is the man-
dated minimum availability of family and medical leave with assurance of job protection upon return 
to work under the recently signed Family and Medical Leave Act, Pub. L. No. 103-3; 107 Stat. 6 
(1993). 
76. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1988 & Supp. III 1991). The provision for state plans is contained in 
section 18, 29 U.S.C. § 667 (1988). 
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through state legislation and administration. 77 In U.S. social welfare leg-
islation, such as Medicare and Medicaid, as opposed to labor and em-
ployment law, one sees increasing instances of federally mandated 
benefits which states are required to provide for their residents as a con-
dition of state participation in the federal program. 78 
One can envision something akin to a directive as a constructive 
approach to U.S. legislation on a subject such as wrongful termination, if 
political consensus were to build sufficiently to support minimum criteria 
for "cause" for discharge, while policymakers simultaneously wished to 
preserve a realm for state experimentation. More likely, however, consis-
tent with U.S. lawmaking patterns, we would expect to see either legisla-
tion at the state level alone, partially harmonized voluntarily through a 
model or uniform act, or, alternatively, Congress might enact a non-
preemptive federal statute permitting, but not requiring, state legislation 
on the topic. 
Like the EC directive, these methods achieve partial elimination of 
interstate competition, but at the price of greater complexity and burden 
for multistate enterprises and, often, greater variation in protections for 
workers. One may wonder, however, about the likelihood of good faith 
implementation of a directive-like U.S. federal statute absent a carrot or 
a stick, such as the receipt or loss of federal funds. The EC countries, 
with the possible exception of the U.K., may be more readily inclined to 
internalize the legitimacy of the commands of a higher confederal au-
thority and voluntarily conform their laws to its mandates. On the other 
hand, without any federal mandate whatsoever, the American political 
process has voluntarily produced many partially harmonized bodies of 
law through widespread state adoption of model or uniform laws. Where 
the interests of business have strongly favored uniformity, we see results 
such as the nearly universal adoption of the Uniform Commercial 
Code.79 
With limited exceptions, already noted, the major EC labor policy 
instruments, present and proposed, have taken the form of directives. A 
77. 42 U.S.C. § 503(a) (1988) (listing provisions which must be included in state unemployment 
insurance laws). 
78. E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1396a (1988 & Supp. 1111991) (Medicaid); 42 U.S.C. §§ 602, 604 (1988 & 
Supp. III 1991) (Aid to Families with Dependent Children). 
79. I JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § I, at I (3d 
ed. 1988) (as of 1988, one of three consecutive official versions of the UCC was in effect in forty-nine 
states, the District of Columbia and the Virgin Islands; three retained the 1962 version, fourteen 
retained the 1972 version and thirty-two had adopted the 1978 official text). Nevertheless, the UCC 
as adopted by the states, is not entirely uniform, even among states which have adopted the same 
version, because of local amendments to the text, adoption of optional provisions, and judicial inter-
pretation of open-ended statutory phraseology such as "good faith." /d. § 3, at 7-8. 
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comparison of this corpus of present and proposed law to U.S. labor and 
employment law is revealing. 
First, one should note that the very existence of the Maastricht Pro-
tocol and Agreement on Social Policy signifies the victory of those polit-
ical forces who believe that the EC labor market and social conditions 
should be made to gradually converge, at least in part, through the force 
of legal standards. Advocates for this position appear to have triumphed 
over those, such as the government of the U.K., who wish to achieve 
approximation through market forces alone. 80 
Until now, much EC labor-related legislation was justified on the 
rationale that approximation of the laws of Member States via an EC 
directive would improve the functioning of the single labor market by 
eliminating unfair competition. These directives were regarded as neces-
sary to bring a unitary labor market into being, and consensus that labor 
competition between countries on these grounds was "unfair," i.e., so-
cially unacceptable, encompassed the U.K. as well as the other EC mem-
bers. Directives to ensure the free movement of workers without 
discrimination on the basis ofEC nationality,81 directives requiring non-
discrimination based on sex, 82 equal remuneration based on sex, 83 health 
and safety,84 and regulations regarding coordination of Member States 
social security systems to ensure no loss of benefits for workers migrating 
across national boundaries, 85 all fit this pattern. 
Two observations should be made about the legislation in this cate-
gory. First, with a limited exception regarding the health and safety 
80. BLANPAIN, supra note 2, para. 6. 
81. Council Directive 90/364, 1990 O.J. (L 180) 26 (free movement for citizens in general); 
Council Directive 90/365, 1990 O.J. (L 180) 28 (free movement for workers and retirees); Council 
Directive 90/366, 1990 O.J. (L 180) 30 (free movement for students). Free movement of workers is 
regarded as one of the four fundamental freedoms, essential to the creation of the single market. See 
Blanpain, supra note 41, para. 127. There is also a regulation to assure equal treatment of workers 
based on EC Member State nationality. Council Regulation 1612/68, 1968 O.J. SPEC. Eo. (L 254) 2, 
as amended by Council Regulation 2434/92, 1992 O.J. (L 247) I and Council Regulation 312176, 
1976 O.J. (L 39) 2. See generally BLANPAIN, supra note 41, paras. 145-157. 
82. Equal Treatment Directive, Council Directive 76/207, 1976 O.J. (L 39) 40. 
83. Council Directive 75/117, 1975 OJ. (L 45) 19. Article 119 itself, requiring equal remuner-
ation, was specifically adopted, in part, to avoid competitive disadvantage to undertakings in states 
which had adopted equal pay legislation when competing against businesses in other Member States. 
Case 43175, Defrenne v. Sabena (Defrenne II), 1976 E.C.R. 455, 471-72, 2 C.M.L.R. 98, 110-11 
(1976). See generally EVELYN ELLIS, EUROPEAN CoMMUNITY SEX EQUALITY LAW 38-42 (1991). 
84. Council Directive 89/391, 1989 OJ. (L 183) I. Numerous individual directives have been 
adopted pursuant to this framework directive, and many more are proposed. See BLANPAIN, supra 
note 41, paras. 261-281. 
85. Council Regulation 1408171, 1971 O.J. (L 149) 2, as amended by Council Regulation 1390/ 
81, 1981 O.J. (L 143) I; Council Regulation 574/72, 1972 O.J. (L 74) I, as amended by Council 
Regulation 3795/81, 1981 O.J. (L 378) I, Council Regulation 2001/83, 1983 O.J. (L 230) 6, Council 
Regulation 2332/89, 1989 O.J. (L 224) I, and Council Regulation 3427/89, 1989 O.J. (L 331) I. See 
generally STEINER, supra note 60, at 233-47. 
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framework directive, 86 each of these laws addresses what Americans 
would regard as individual rights, rather than collective interests in the 
workplace. Second, to each of these directives there corresponds a paral-
lel body of law in the United States. Free movement of workers across 
state lines, and nondiscrimination based on American state of origin, at 
least where governmental action is involved, are established by the Privi-
leges and Immunities Clause of the U.S. Constitution and the Equal Pro-
tection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 87 Equal remuneration for 
women and men, as created by the EC Treaty itself, 88 encompasses 
claims similar to those which may be brought under the U.S. Equal Pay 
Act, 89 as well as those viable under the broadened prohibition against 
intentional sex discrimination in any form of compensation contained in 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.90 Indeed, at least as amplified 
86. The health and safety directive includes provisions for consultation with worker representa-
tives. Council Directive 89/391, art. 11, 1989 O.J. (L 183) 1. 
87. U.S. CONST. art. IV§ 2; U.S. CoNST. amend. XIV. See generally LAURENCE H. TRIBE, 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 7-2 to 7-4, at 548-59 (2d ed. 1988). 
88. For a detailed analysis of EC caselaw interpreting Article 119, see PRECHAL & BuRROWS, 
supra note 42, at 49-81; ELLIS, supra note 83 at 42-82. 
89. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1988 & Supp. III 1991). The Equal Pay Act prohibits the payment 
of unequal compensation to men and women performing "substantially equal" work requiring equal 
skill, effort, and responsibility, and performed under similar working conditions. To the extent that 
the EC equal pay directive encompasses something closer to what Americans have labelled "pay 
equity" or "comparable worth," it resembles an earlier version of the bill which was ultimately 
enacted as the Equal Pay Act, and which would have reached "work of comparable value." H.R. 
10226, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., § 4 (1962), and H.R. 8898, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., § 4 (1961), would 
identically have prohibited an employer from "paying wages to any employee at a rate less than the 
rate at which he pays wages to any employee of the opposite sex for work of comparable character 
on jobs the performance of which requires comparable skills, except where such payment is made 
pursuant to a seniority or merit increase system which does not discriminate on the basis of sex." 
The following year, the administration's bill, H.R. 3861, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., § 4(a), (1963), would 
have prohibited an employer from "paying wages at a rate less than the rate at which he pays wages 
to any employee of the opposite sex in such place of employment for equal work on jobs the per-
formance of which requires equal skills, except where such payment is made pursuant to a seniority 
or merit increase system which does not discriminate on the basis of sex." A major difference be-
tween even the administration's proposed bill and the Equal Pay Act as enacted is that "[t]he con-
cept of equal pay for jobs demanding equal skill has been expanded to require equal effort, 
responsibility, and similar working conditions as well." H.R. REP. No. 309, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 
reprinted in 1963 U.S.C.C.A.N. 687, 690 (supplemental views). 
90. Section 703(a)(l) of Title VII prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, 
sex, and national origin, as to compensation. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (1988). Section 703(h) of 
Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h), however, permits employers to defend against such claims by 
relying on the affirmative defenses provided under the Equal Pay Act, which include pay differentia-
tion on the basis of the quantity or quality of production, seniority, merit, and any other factor other 
than sex. In County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161 (1981), the Supreme Court accepted 
the plaintiff's contention that the prohibition against sex discrimination in compensation under Title 
VII reached farther than the Equal Pay Act, and encompassed all forms of intentional, sex-based 
differentiation in compensation, subject to the stated defenses. See also Bazemore v. Friday, 478 
U.S. 385 (1986) (accepting claim of intentional race-based discrimination in compensation regarding 
substantially different, but comparable, jobs under Title VII). However, the Gunther Court ex-
pressly disavowed accepting broader notions of comparable worth. 452 U.S. at 166. In subsequent 
cases, the lower courts have consistently rejected compensation discrimination claims absent proof of 
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through the EC equal pay directive, community law goes farther than 
that, verging on theories of pay equity and comparable worth which in 
the U.S. failed to achieve a legal toehold during the Reagan-Bush years.91 
"Equal treatment" for men and women in the EC has been inter-
preted to encompass both "direct" and "indirect" discrimination.92 
Americans would apply the European label "direct" discrimination to 
what our courts categorize as "intentional discrimination," including fa-
cial discrimination and disparate treatment. "Indirect discrimination" 
would roughly correspond to "disparate impact," as codified under Title 
VII as amended by the Civil Rights Act of 1991.93 Despite some impor-
tant differences,94 the prohibitions against sex discrimination in the U.S. 
and the EC seek similar ends via roughly similar means. 
intentional discrimination in the setting of the remuneration, unless the jobs were substantially 
equal, hence stated a claim under the equal pay act. See, e.g., American Nurses' Ass'n v. Illinois, 
783 F.2d 716 (7th Cir. 1986). 
91. The directive defines the Article 119 obligation of equal pay for men and women as requir-
ing equal pay "for the same work or for work to which equal value is attributed, the elimination of 
all discrimination on grounds of sex, with regard to all aspects and conditions of remuneration." 
Judicial characterization of the directive as merely elaborating the scope of Article 119, and inter-
preting the proscription to reach "indirect' as well as "direct" discrimination, is discussed in depth in 
PRECHAL & BURROWS, supra note 42, at 81-98; ELLIS, supra note 83, at 96-116. Characterizing the 
treaty provision as encompassing the same scope of claims as the directive permits private parties to 
sue other private parties, even where the Member State in which both reside has yet to adopt na-
tional legislation implementing the directive. Provided the different compensation of men and wo-
men is facially apparent from the nature of the employment practice, the alleged victim of 
discrimination may rely directly on Article 119 in a suit against her employer brought in her na-
tional court or tribunal. 
92. The Equal Treatment Directive, Council Directive 76/207, art. 2(1), 1976 O.J. (L 39) 40, 
states in part, "the principle of equal treatment shall mean that there shall be no discrimination 
whatsoever on grounds of sex either directly or indirectly by reference in particular to marital or 
family status." The Court of Justice has relied on this language to construe the remaining provisions 
of the directive, prohibiting discrimination in employment selection criteria, access to jobs and pro-
motions, vocational training and retraining, dismissal, and working conditions, as reaching both 
direct and indirect discrimination. See PRECHAL & BURROWS, supra note 42, at 12-21, 71-77 (dis-
cussing these concepts regarding nationality discrimination, equal pay, and equal treatment on the 
basis of sex). 
93. Section 703(k)(l) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(l), as amended by Pub. L. 102-166, 
105 Stat. l074(k)(l) (1991). 
94. In addition to differences noted above, an extremely significant difference is the treatment of 
the complex of issues surrounding pregnancy, reproductive health hazards, motherhood, and chil-
drearing. See PRECHAL & BURROWS, supra note 42, at 115-18. For example, the EC recently 
adopted a directive in the nature of protective legislation for pregnant women and those who have 
recently given birth. This directive resolves the conflict between women's demands for equality and 
autonomous risk-taking, on the one hand, and social protection for the health of all workers as well 
as children, on the other. The EC solution is very different from that reached by the U.S. Supreme 
Court in construing Title VII's prohibition against discrimination on the basis of pregnancy, child-
birth, and related medical conditions. Compare Council Directive 92/85, art. 5, 1992 O.J. (L 348) I 
(requiring removal of pregnant or breastfeeding women from positions entailing exposure to fetal 
health hazards if the employer cannot otherwise modify the worker's job duties or working condi-
tions, but mandating no loss of pay) with International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Ill S. Ct. 
1196, 1202-04 ( 1991) (construing Title VII to prohibit involuntary protection of women, but not 
men, from reproductive health hazards they choose to encounter); id. at 1207 ("Employment late in 
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A caveat could be added here. The decision by the EC Member 
States to include a prohibition against sex-based wage discrimination in 
the original EEC Treaty was motivated by fear of interstate economic 
competition, as well as by moral imperatives regarding sex discrimina-
tion. 95 Member States with higher labor costs already feared the height-
ened risk of capital flight to competing EC countries with uniformly low 
compensation costs. High labor-cost states with equal pay legislation in 
force wished to preclude sex-based wage competition from further stimu-
lating capital mobility. Absent an equal remuneration provision, they 
feared that a great deal of capital investment would be shifted to those 
Member States having an available, low wage, predominantly female 
workforce to undercut the higher prevailing wages of male workers at the 
original site of the operation. However, the legislative history of the 
American Equal Pay Act likewise reflects an often forgotten yet similar 
desire on the part of some of the bill's supporters to preserve jobs for men 
by mandating equal pay for women, and to prevent "unfair competition" 
through payment of substandard wages to women for performing "men's 
work."96 
pregnancy often imposes risks on the unborn ctiitd ... , but Congress indicated that the employer 
may take into account only the woman's ability to get her job done."). 
In addition, the preamble to the EC pregnancy directive specifically disavows "an analogy be· 
tween pregnancy and illness," 1992 O.J. (L ~48) at 2, while the American prohibition against 
pregnancy-related discrimination in employment specifies that "women affected by pregnancy, child· 
birth or related medical conditions shall be treated the same for all employment related purposes ... 
as other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to work .... " Sec. 701(k) of 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)(k). 
95. See Defrenne v. Sabena (Defrenne II), 1976 E.C.R. 455,472-73. See generally PRECHAL & 
BURROWS, supra note 42, at 53. 
96. In the declaration of purpose portion of the bill enacted as the Equal Pay Act, like each of 
its major predecessor bills, H.R. 3861, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., § 2(a)(5) (1963); H.R. 10226, 87th 
Cong., 2d Sess., § 2(a)(5) (1962); and H.R. 8898, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., § 2(a)(5) (1961), Congress 
finds, inter alia, that "wage differentials based on sex ... constitutes an unfair method of competi· 
tion." Equal Pay Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-38, § 2(a)(5); 77 Stat. 56 (1963), reprinted in 1963 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 59. See also. e.g., Hearings Before the Select Subcommittee on Labor of the Committee 
on Education and Labor, House of Representatives, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., on H.R. 8898; H.R. 10226, 
pt. 1, at 2 ("Although women would have more to gain than men ... , such a law would protect men 
as well as women from discriminatory rates .... [T]o women ... it signifies justice in wage treat· 
ment; to men - it helps sustain wage rates and discourages employers from hiring women at lower 
rates .... ") (statement of Chairman Zelenka); id. at II ("The bill would diminish the possibilities 
of using women to force wages down and of taking advantage of the sharp competition for jobs in 
times of substantial unemployment.") (statement of Secretary of Labor Arthur J. Goldberg). 
This is not to suggest, however, that benign motives did not play the leading role in persuading 
Congress to adopt the Equal Pay Act; rather, these pro-women motives tend to be remembered to 
the exclusion of the pro-men objectives. See, e.g., Coming Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 
195-201 (1974). The Equal Pay Act was passed "to remedy what was perceived to be a serious and 
endemic problem of [sex based] employment discrimination in private industry-the fact that the 
wage structure of 'many segments of American industry has been based on an ancient but outmoded 
belief that a man, because of his role in society, should be paid more than a woman even though his 
duties are the same.'" /d. at 195, (quoting S. REP. No. 176, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 1 (1963). See also 
County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 166-69 (1981)). 
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The EC's health and safety framework directive97 was modelled in 
many respects after the American Occupational Safety and Health Act 
(OSHA),98 one of the few examples of a U.S. labor law development 
crossing the Atlantic to the east, when the prevailing winds generally 
blow toward the west. Proposed prohibitions and restrictions on child 
labor99 have their counterparts in the U.S. Fair Labor Standards Act. 1oo 
Finally, the regulations on transnational social security101 serve a func-
tion similar to the U.S. interstate coordination rules regarding unemploy-
ment insurance, 102 as well as the federalizing aspects of ERISA, in easing 
benefit losses to workers who seek new jobs across state lines. 
Encouraging worker mobility, eliminating discrimination in the la-
bor market, and taking abuse of worker health and safety and the ex-
ploitation of child labor out of the realm of lawful means of business 
competition reflect policies essential to any well-functioning, unified la-
bor market in a democratic society. It is hardly surprising therefore, that 
similar policies which address these topics exist both in the U.S. and the 
EC-they are premised on models of the labor market which assume 
autonomous individual workers as actors. The most noteworthy excep-
tion to this parallelism is the presence in the U.S., and the absence at the 
EC level in the European Community, of enforceable prohibitions 
against discrimination on the basis of factors other than sex or state of 
origin, including race, color, religion, national origin, age and disability. 
The remaining enacted EC labor directives, as well as pending pro-
posed directives, highlight the major divergence in social philosophy and 
labor policy between the EC and the US. In the 1970s, while a labor 
government was in power in the U.K., the EC adopted three important 
policies focusing on collective interests of workers: the 1975 directive on 
collective redundancies, 103 the 1977 directive on transfers of opera-
tions, 104 and the 1980 directive on insolvencies. 105 
97. Council Directive 89/391, 1989 O.J. (L 183) I. 
98. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1988 & Supp. III 1991). 
99. Proposed Council Directive, 1992 O.J. (C 84) 7. 
100. 29 U.S.C. §§ 203(1), 212 (1988 & Supp. III 1991). 
10 I. Council Regulation 1408/71, 1971 O.J. (L 149) 2, as amended by Council Regulation 1390/ 
81, 1981 O.J. (L 143) I; Council Regulation 574/72, 1972 O.J. (L 74) I, as amended by Council 
Regulation 3795/81, 1981 O.J. (L 378) 5, Council Regulation 2001/83, 1983 O.J. (L 230) 6, Council 
Regulation 2332/89, 1989 O.J. (L 224) I, and Council Regulation 3427/89, 1989 O.J. (L 331) I. 
102. 42 u.s.c. § 503 (1988). 
103. Council Directive, 75/129, 1975 O.J. (L 48) 29, as amended by Council Directive 92/56, 
1992 O.J. (L 245) 3. 
104. Council Directive, 77/187, 1977 O.J. (L 61) 26. 
105. Council Directive, 80/987, 1980 O.J. (L 283) 23, as amended by Council Directive 87/164, 
1987 O.J. (L 66) II. A thorough discussion of the three directives may be found in Janice Bellace, 
Employment Protection in the EEC, 20 STAN. J. INT'L L. 413 (1984). Comparisons employing the 
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The directive on insolvencies requires all EC Member States to en-
act legislation ensuring full payment of workers' earned compensation 
during a specified time period, as well as full payment of their state social 
security system benefits, even if the employer failed to transmit the with-
held employee contributions. 106 This directive may be compared with 
U.S. federal bankruptcy law priorities for workers' pay and pensions. 107 
The EC directive is more limited than the U.S. worker priority rules in 
one respect: the EC directive applies only to outright liquidations, simi-
lar to U.S. Chapter 7 Bankruptcy and not to corporate reorganizations in 
bankruptcy, akin to those under Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy 
Code. 108 On the other hand, the EC directive guarantees workers their 
pay, rather than merely establishing priority vis a vis other unsecured 
creditors and behind all secured creditors. The EC directive accom-
plishes this by requiring each Member State to establish an insurance 
fund, out of which employees' claims are paid if the employers' assets, 
under ordinary rules of bankruptcy liquidation, are insufficient to satisfy 
their claims. 109 
The 1975 EC directive on collective redundancies, strengthened by 
June 24, 1992 amendments, provides several illuminating comparisons to 
U.S. labor law. The directive requires all employers employing more 
than a minimum threshold of employees, who terminate or permanently 
lay off those workers for reasons unrelated to the individual, to assure 
underlying law of EC Member States regarding these matters maybe found in Clyde W. Summers, 
Comparative Perspectives, in LABOR LAW AND BUSINESS CHANGE 139 (Samuel Estreicher & Daniel 
G. Collins eds., 1988). 
106. See BLANPAIN, supra note 41, paras. 322-328. 
107. II U.S.C. § 507(a)(3) (1988) (priority for unpaid wages); id. § 507(a)(4) (priority for unpaid 
pension benefits). 
108. The directive states, in part: 
[A]n employer shall be deemed to be in a state of insolvency: 
(a) where a request has been made for the opening of proceedings involving the em-
ployer's assets, ... to satisfy collectively the claims of creditors ... , and 
(b) where the authority which is competent ... has: either decided to open the pro-
ceedings, or established that the employer's undertaking or business has been definitively 
closed down and that the available assets are insufficient to warrant the opening of the 
proceedings. 
In cases of reorganization under the protection of the court ("judicial leave to suspend payment of 
debts"), unlike cases of outright liquidation, Council Directive 77/187 regarding transfers of under-
takings appears to apply, rather than the insolvency directive. See Case No. 135/83, Abels v. The 
Administrative Board of the Bedrijfsvereniging voor de Metaal-industrie en de Electrotechnische 
Industrie, 1985 E.C.R. 469, 2 C.M.L.R. 406 (1985), discussed in BLANPAIN, supra note 41, paras. 
307-308. In addition, under the new amendments to the collective redundancy directive, duties of 
notification, information, and consultation apparently apply to plant closings or mass layoffs result-
ing from judicial orders in bankruptcy reorganizations. See Council Directive 92/56, art. 1(1)(b), 
1992 O.J. (L 245) 3, 4 (deleting "[t]his Directive shall not appiy to ... workers affected by the 
termination of an establishment's activities where that is the result of a judicial decision"), (amend-
ing Council Directive 75/129, art. 1(2), 1975 O.J. (L 48) 29). 
109. See BLANPAIN, supra note 41, paras. 326-328. 
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them of at least thirty days notice, and to notify the appropriate state 
authorities involved in assisting displaced workers. 110 This directive 
should sound familiar to Americans working in the labor law field be-
cause similar provisions became embodied in U.S. law after vigorous 
resistance by the business lobby as well as the Reagan-Bush administra-
tions, by the 1988 passage of the federal Worker Adjustment and Re-
training Notification Act (WARN). 111 
There are important differences between WARN, however, and the 
EC's directive on collective dismissals. First, the EC law applies to rela-
tively small reductions in force, while WARN applies only to facility clo-
sures and mass layoffs of substantial size. 112 Second, U.S. law exempts 
small and even medium size businesses and facilities by its thresholds for 
coverage, while the EC directive covers almost all establishments. 113 
Thus, the EC directive embodies the concept that workers who lose their 
jobs through no fault of their own, are at a minimum entitled to advance 
notice and a modest level of income security. 114 Indeed, most EC coun-
tries also have employment termination statutes which provide for pay 
110. Council Directive 7S/129, 197S O.J. (L 48) 29, as amended by Council Directive 92/S6, 
1992 O.J. (L 245) 3. See BLANPAIN, supra note 41, paras. 283-293. 
Ill. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2109 (1988). 
112. 29 U.S.C. § 2101(a)(3) (1988) defines "mass layoff," one of the two types of qualifying 
events triggering notice obligations on the part of the employer, as: 
a reduction in force which-
(A) is not the result of a plant closing; and 
(B) results in an employment loss at the single site of employment during any 30-day 
period for-
(i) (I) at least 33 percent of the employees (excluding any part-time employees); and 
(II) at least SO employees (excluding any part-time employees); or 
(ii) at least 500 employees (excluding any part-time employees). 
29 U.S.C. § 210I(a) (2) (1988) defines "plant closing," the other qualifying event triggering statutory 
obligations, as a "permanent or temporary shutdown of a single site of employment, or one or more 
facilities or operating units within a single site of employment, if the shutdown results in an employ-
ment loss at the single site of employment during any 30-day period for SO or more employees 
excluding any part-time employees." 
Council Directive 7S/129 defines "collective redundancy," the triggering event under the direc-
tive, as any dismissal for reasons unrelated to the individual workers involved, and sets far lower 
numerical thresholds. The Member State may choose the graduated numerical trigger, of at least ten 
dismissals in an establishment with 20-99 workers, dismissal of at least 10 per cent of the workforce 
in an establishment with 100-299 workers, and dismissal of at least 30 workers in an establishment 
with 300 or more employees. Alternatively, the Member State may elect to trigger the employer's 
redundancy obligations whenever 20 or more employees are terminated within a 90 day period, 
regardless of the number of workers employed. Under the new amendments to the collective redun-
dancy directive, so long as at least five workers lose their jobs because of a reduction in force, all 
terminations of employment contracts by the employer, of whatever type, are to be aggregated in 
determining whether the numerical threshold has been reached. Council Directive 92/S6, art. I (I), 
1992 O.J. (L 245) 3, 4 (amending Council Directive 7S/129, art. I (I)). 
113. Compare 29 U.S.C. § 2101(a)(3)(B)(i)(II) (setting a threshold of SO or more full-time 
equivalent workers for statutory coverage) with Council Directive 7S/129, art. I (setting the thresh-
olds set forth supra note 110). 
114. See, e.g., Bellace, supra note lOS, at 416-17; Summers, supra note lOS, at 161. 
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akin to American severance pay. Read together with the protections 
against collective dismissal, such statutes assure most workers of an ex-
tended period of income security in the event of termination without 
cause. 115 
Third, WARN provides for employer notice to the workers' union 
representative if they have a collective bargaining agent, and otherwise, 
for notice to each individual employee. 116 WARN expressly does not 
otherwise affect U.S. labor law, and the NLRA continues to govern the 
extent to which an employer has a duty to bargain collectively over a 
decision to relocate and its effects on the workers, as well as a duty to 
supply information relevant to the bargaining. 117 Current case law sug-
gests that an employer has no duty to bargain over a decision to totally 
cease operations, for whatever reason; 118 a duty to bargain over any sort 
of capital redeployment decision motivated by the employer's desire to 
chill interest in unionization in the employer's remaining facilities, 119 no 
duty to bargain over a decision to leave a line of business entirely unless 
the employer is motivated by anti-union animus, 120 a duty to bargain 
over runaway shops, where relocation of operations is based on the em-
ployer's desire to escape the union, 121 a duty to bargain over plant reloca-
tions, subcontracting, operational consolidation and other capital 
redeployment decisions whenever they are motivated by anti-union ani-
mus, 122 a duty to bargain over decisions to subcontract operations, at 
least where the decision is tantamount to substitution of the contractor's 
workforce for the employer's, 123 and a duty to bargain over these types of 
capital redeployment decisions whenever they depend on labor costs, or 
perhaps other labor-related factors. 124 Much of this case law is hotly 
115. See COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN CoMMUNITIES, SUMMARY REPORT OF THE COM-
PARATIVE STUDY ON RULES GOVERNING WORKING CONDmONS IN THE MEMBER STATES, sec. 
(89) 926 final at 10-11 (1989) [hereinafter SUMMARY REPORT). 
116. 29 U.S.C. § 2102(a)(l) (1988). 
117. 29 u.s.c. § 2105 (1988). 
118. See First Nat'! Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666 (1981); see·a/so Textile Workers 
Union v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263 (1965). 
119. Darlington, 380 U.S. at 274-75. 
120. Pittsburgh & Lake Erie R.R. v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 491 U.S. 490 (1989) 
(construing Railway Labor Act); First Nat'/ Maintenance, 452 U.S. at 682 (construing NLRA). 
121. Darlington, 380 U.S. at 275-76. 
122. See, e.g., Sullivan Motor Delivery, Inc., 301 N.L.R.B. No. 37 (1991); Strawsine Mfg. Co., 
280 N.L.R.B. 553 (1986). See also Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 211 
(1964) (holding that a decision to subcontract janitorial operations on the facility premises consti-
tuted a mandatory subject of bargaining, without regard to motive); Darlington, 380 U.S. at 269-74 
(distinguishing such forms of anti-union motivated capital redeployment from the decision to com-
pletely go out of business). 
123. Fibreboard Paper Prods., 379 U.S. at 209. 
124. Dubuque Packing Co., 303 N.L.R.B. No. 66 (1991), is the NLRB's latest major pronounce-
ment in this area. To the questionable extent that it retains viability after Pittsburgh & Lake Erie 
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contested and changes with the changing composition of the Board. 125 
In addition, there is always a duty to bargain over the effects capital rede-
ployment decisions have on the workers, including severance pay, early 
retirement or other special compensation packages, transfers to other po-
sitions or locations operated by the employer, job retraining, outplace-
ment assistance and the like. 126 While U.S. employers have furiously 
opposed bearing a duty to bargain over redeployment decisions, they 
have been less adamant about bargaining over effects, and the case law 
about effects bargaining appears to be well-settled. 
Finally, U.S. labor law obligates an employer to supply the union 
with information relevant to the scope of mandatory bargaining. 127 To 
the extent that an employer need not bargain over the decision, but only 
over its effects on workers, the employer avoids any duty to disclose fi-
nancial and operational information underlying the restructuring 
decision. 
The EC directive charts quite a different course. Any employer 
whose workers have a representative has a duty to supply the representa-
tive with information pertaining to the redeployment decision, as well as 
its effects on the work force, and must "begin consultations with the 
workers' representatives in good time with a view to reaching an agree-
ment."128 This differs from U.S. law in many ways. First, this aspect of 
the directive, like the notice provision, applies to nearly all employers 
and nearly all reduction-in-force related job terminations. In the U.S. 
collective bargaining context, the NLRB is more likely to find a duty to 
bargain over a decision affecting only a few workers, which will be la-
belled a lay off, and analyzed as an employment decision. 129 Elimination 
R.R., Order ofR.R. Telegraphers v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 362 U.S. 330 (1960), characterizes most 
forms of capital redeployment as mandatory subjects of bargaining under the Railway Labor Act. 
125. Compare Dubuque Packing Co., 303 N.L.R.B. No. 66 (holding to be a mandatory subject 
of bargaining, plant relocations in which labor costs are a motivating factor), with Otis Elevator Co., 
269 N.L.R.B. 891 (1984) (relocations are mandatory subject only when the decision turns on labor 
costs). The conflicting lines of cases regarding capital redeployment decisions are discussed in Mar-
ley S. Weiss, Risky Business: Age and Race Discrimination in Capital Redeployment Decisions, 48 
Mo. L. REV. 901, 939-75, 990-94 (1989). 
126. See Pittsburgh & Lake Erie R.R. v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 491 U.S. 490, 516 
(1989) (construing Railway Labor Act); First Nat') Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 681-
82 (1981) (construing NLRA). 
127. NLRB v. Acme Industrial Co, 385 U.S. 432 (1967) (employer must supply information 
necessary to permit union to intelligently process grievance arising under the collective bargaining 
agreement); NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149, 153 (1956) (employer who pleads poverty must 
provide union with access to full information about employer's financial health). 
128. Council Directive 75/129, art. 2 (3), as amended by Council Directive 92/56, 1992 0.1. (L 
245) 4 (duty to supply "all relevant information"), id. art. 2 (1) ("begin consultations with the 
workers' representatives in good time with a view to reaching an agreement"). See BLANPAIN, supra 
note 41, paras. 288-290. 
129. See, e.g., Adair Standish Corp., 292 N.L.R.B. 101 (1989); Morco Indus., Inc., 279 
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of a shift, department, or facility, however, will be perceived as having 
left the realm of employment decisions and become, instead, an en-
trepreneurial decision with direct effects on workers' jobs. 130 The deci-
sion will then be subjected to a balancing test which has produced the 
complex and manipulable rules discussed above regarding whether an 
employer owes the union a duty to bargain over its decision. 131 
Second, the purpose of the EC directive is to give the workers' repre-
sentative adequate notice, information and opportunity to propose crea-
N.L.R.B. 762, 762-63 (1986). See also First National Maintenance, 452 U.S. at 677 ("Other man-
agement decisions, such as the order of succession of layoffs and recalls, production quotas, and 
work rules, are almost exclusively 'an aspect of the relationship' between employer and employee 
.... "(hence mandatory bargaining subjects)) (quoting Allied Chemical & Alkali Workers v. Pitts-
burgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157, 178 (1971)). 
130. See First Nat'/ Maintenance, 452 U.S. at 677 ("The present case concerns a third type of 
management decision, one that had a direct impact on employment, since jobs were inexorably elimi-
nated by the termination, but had as its focus only the economic profitability of the contract with 
Greenpark, a concern under these facts wholly apart from the employment relationship. This deci-
sion, involving a change in the scope and direetion of the enterprise, is akin to the decision whether 
to be in business at all, 'not in [itself] primarily about conditions of employment, though the effect of 
the decision may be necessarily to terminate employment,' . . . . At the same time, this decision 
touches on a matter of central and pressing concern to the union and its member employees: the 
possibility of continued employment and the retention of the employees' very jobs.") (quoting 
Fibreboard Paper Prods., 379 U.S., at 223 (Stewart, J., concurring)). 
131. The balancing test is set forth in First National Maintenance: 
[B]argaining over management decisions that have a substantial impact on the continued 
availability of employment should be required only if the benefit, for labor-management 
relations and the collective-bargaining process, outweighs the burden placed on the con-
duct of the business." 452 U.S. at 679. The Court's application of the test sheds some light 
on its otherwise abstract content: "We conclude that the harm likely to be done to an 
employer's need to operate freely in deciding whether to shut down part of its business 
purely for economic reasons outweighs the incremental benefit that might be gained 
through the union's participation in making the decision, and we hold that the decision 
itself is not part of§ 8(d)'s 'terms and conditions' ... over which Congress has mandated 
bargaining. 
/d. at 686. 
Later in the decision, the Court delineated its holding somewhat differently: 
In order to illustrate the limits of our holding, we tum again to the specific facts of this 
case. First, we note that when petitioner decided to terminate its Greenpark contract, it 
had no intention to replace the discharged employees or to move that operation elsewhere. 
Petitioner's sole purpose was to reduce its economic loss, and the union made no claim of 
antiunion animus. In addition, petitioner's dispute with Greenpark was solely over the size 
of the management fee Greenpark was willing to pay. The union had no control or author-
ity over that fee .... These facts in particular distinguish this case from the subcontracting 
issue presented in Fibreboard. Further, the union was not selected as the bargaining repre-
sentative or certified until well after petitioner's economic difficulties at Greenpark had 
begun. We thus are not faced with an employer's abrogation of ongoing negotiations or an 
existing bargaining agreement. Finally, while petitioner's business enterprise did not in-
volve the investment of large amounts of capital in single locations, we do not believe that 
the absence of "significant investment or withdrawal of capital," is crucial. The decision to 
halt work at this specific location represented a significant change in petitioner's opera-
tions, a change not unlike opening a new line of business or going out of business entirely. 
Id. at 687-88 (citations omitted). The NLRB has had extreme difficulty applying the language of the 
opinion to the diverse, concrete factors involved in capital redeployment cases. Compare Dubuque 
Packing Co., 303 N.L.R.B. No. 66 (1991) with Otis Elevator Co. 269 N.L.R.B 891, 895 (1984) 
(plurality opinion). 
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tive alternatives which can reduce if not eradicate entirely the 
elimination of workers' jobs. 132 Failing that, the workers' representatives 
are provided with an opportunity to present proposals to ameliorate the 
consequences for the terminated workers, 133 much like "effects" bargain-
ing in U.S. labor law,134 
Third, the EC's stated mandatory notice period is only thirty days, 
compared to sixty days under WARN. m On the other hand, EC Mem-
ber States may legislate longer notice periods, 136 those with periods 
shorter than sixty days may authorize appropriate governmental authori-
ties, "in cases where the problems raised by the projected collective re-
dundancies are not likely to be solved withing the initial period," to 
extend the notification period for up to a total of sixty days, and any 
Member State may grant its appropriate agency broader authority to ex-
tend or reduce the advance notice period in particular cases or classes of 
cases. 137 
The fourth difference is that consultation over the redeployment de-
cision is just that--consultation and not negotiation. Under most Mem-
ber States' laws, workers may not lawfully bring economic weapons to 
bear, and are limited to persuasion and moral suasion. 138 
Here, however, the difference compared to American labor law may 
be less real than it seems. Most American collective bargaining agree-
132. See Council Directive 92/56, art. 2 (2), 1992 O.J. (L 245) 4, (amending Council Directive 
75/129, art. 2 (2), 1975 O.J. (L 48) 30) ("These consultations shall, at least, cover ways and means of 
avoiding collective redundancies or reducing the number of workers affected."). 
133. See id. ("These consultations shall, at least, cover ways and means ... of mitigating the 
consequences by recourse to accompanying social measures amid, inter alia, aid for redeploying or 
retraining workers made redundant"). 
134. The duty to bargain over effects remains well-settled in American labor law. See First Nat'/ 
Maintenance, 452 U.S. at 681-82. ("There is no dispute that the union must be given a significant 
opportunity to bargain about these matters of job security as part of the 'effects' bargaining man-
dated by § 8(a)(5). And, under § 8(a)(5), bargaining over the effects of a decision must be conducted 
in a meaningful manner and at a meaningful time, and the Board may impose sanctions to insure its 
adequacy") (citations omitted). 
135. Compare Council Directive 75/129, art. 4(1) with§ 2102(a) of WARN, 29 U.S.C. § 2102(a) 
(1988) (flat sixty day notice requirement) and id. § 2102(b) (identifying exceptional circumstances 
justifying unilateral employer provision of a shorter notice period). 
136. Council Directive 75/129, art. 5. In addition, the thirty day minimum is triggered by no-
tice to the state authorities, which can only be given notice after reasonable consultation with work-
ers' representatives because it must include information about the consultations. See id. art. 3 (1). 
In effect, therefore, the minimum notice to workers representatives is considerably more than thirty 
days. 
137. /d. art. 4 (I), (3). Member States may also exempt from the advance notification require-
ment those cases where the collective redundancies are caused by "termination of the establishment's 
activities where this is the result of a judicial decision," primarily in cases of insolvency, or may do 
so subject to the possibility of the appropriate governmental agency nonetheless requiring advance 
notice in particular cases. Council Directive 92/129, art. I (3), (4) (amending Council Directive 75/ 
129, art. 3 (1)). 
138. See Bellace, supra note 105, at 428-29. See also BLAINPAIN, supra note 2, paras. 79-80. 
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ments contain no-strike provisions which severely limit the unions' lever-
age when faced with a mid-term capital redeployment. 139 In addition, 
where the entire facility is to be closed, U.S. unions often have no real 
weapon in the threat of a work stoppage, even absent a no-strike provi-
sion.140 The European workers' representatives, on the other hand, may 
have real, albeit informal leverage in their co-decision-making power 
over other matters, providing management with a strong inducement to 
maintain amicable relations. 141 One might compare the position of the 
workers' representatives, under these circumstances, to the situation in 
American labor law of an employer "voluntarily" acceding to a powerful 
union's desire to bargain over a permissive subject of bargaining, over 
which the employer is lawfully entitled to decline to bargain, lest the 
relationship rupture in a fashion more costly to the employer over 
mandatory bargaining subjects. 
As to the effects of restructuring decisions on workers, the EC em-
ployer's duty is one of "consultations . . . with a view to reaching an 
agreement."142 Professor Blanpain characterizes this obligation as verg-
ing on a duty to bargain in good faith. 143 Significa~tly, the obligation to 
supply information under the EC directive is far more substantial than a 
U.S. employer's duty to supply information related to collective bargain-
ing. The EC employer must provide "all relevant information" and: 
[I]n any event notify the workers' representative in writing of (i) the 
reasons for the redundancies; (ii) the number and categories of workers 
to be made redundant; (iii) the number and categories of workers nor-
mally employed; (iv) the period over which the projected redundancies 
are to be effected; (v) the criteria proposed for the selection of the 
workers to be made redundant ... ; (vi) the method for calculating any 
redundancy payments other than those arising out of national legisla-
tion and practice."l44 
European workers' representatives are afforded sufficiently detailed infor-
139. See BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, BASIC PATTERNS IN UNION CONTRACTS at 93 (lith 
ed. 1986) (no-strike clauses found in 94% of surveyed agreements). 
140. See ROBERT A. GoRMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW: UNIONIZATION AND COLLEC· 
TIVE BARGAINING 144-48, 509-23 (1976). 
141. For example, see Professor Janice Bellace's description of the German works council's lev-
erage in negotiation of the "social plan" regarding treatment of .any reduction-in-force. Bellace, 
supra note 105, at 440-41. 
142. Council Directive 75/129, 1975 O.J. (L 48) 29, art. 2 (I), as amended by Council Directive 
92/56, art. 2 (I), 1992 O.J. (L 245) 4. To ihe extent that the ways and means of avoiding the 
redundancies or reducing the numbers of workers affected entails bargaining over the capital rede-
ployment decision itself, rather than its consequences for workers, the same duty apparently applies 
to consultation over the decision. 
143. BLANPAIN, supra note 41, para. 290; BLANPAIN, supra note 2, paras. 79, 80. See also Bel-
lace, supra note 105, at 428-29 (definition depends on national law). 
144. Council Directive 75/129, art. 2 (3), 1975 O.J. (L 48) 29, as amended by Council Directive 
92/56, art. 2 (3), 1992 O.J. (L 245) 3, 4. 
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mation about the company's operations, present and future, to make via-
ble the possibility that they will propose useful alternatives to reductions 
in force and truly helpful paliatives for the impact on those workers who 
lose their positions. 145 
Last, only about 12% of the private sector U.S. labor force is cur-
rently represented by a union, 146 and no duty to bargain, inform or con-
sult applies to them except the sixty day notice requirement established 
by WARN. 147 In the EC, the term "workers' representatives" encom-
passes the several types of representatives, including trade unions and 
works councils, who represent the interests of workers in dealing with 
management regarding the determination of conditions of employment 
through collective bargaining, consultation, or other processes, pursuant 
to the diverse labor relations laws of the Member States. 148 In several 
EC countries, every employer above a modest size threshold is required 
to consult with a works council or other body composed of representa-
tives elected from among the ranks of the workers at the facility. 149 Con-
sequently, the directive applies to a much higher percentage of the EC 
workforce than does the U.S. labor law duty to bargain. 
The 1978 directive on transfers of operations presents an even 
145. See BLANPA1N, supra note 41, para. 289. 
146. The most recent statistic regarding the percentage of private sector workers who are union 
members is 11.8%, according to U.S. Secretary of Labor Robert Reich's testimony during his Senate 
confirmation hearings. See Confirmation Hearings Roundup, Congress Daily, Jan. 7, 1993, available 
in LEXIS, Legis Library, CNGDL Y File. Counting public sector along with private sector, union 
membership has declined to 16% of the workforce. Today's Summary & Analysis, DAILY LAB. 
REP. (BNA) No. 238, at A-A (Dec. 10, 1992). The percentage of private sector workers represented 
by a union may be a bit higher, because unions represent all the members of a bargaining unit, 
include those who decline to join the union and pay full union dues. On the other hand, the number 
could be an overestimate, because many unions count laid-off members or retirees or both on their 
membership lists. Despite the need for caution in comparing national union membership statistics, 
which may rely on different factors in counting members, one may readily conclude that "the United 
States remains a country of low union density in comparison with ... most of Western Europe." 
Clara Chang & Constance Sorrentino, Union Membership Statistics in 12 Countries, 114 MONTHLY 
LAB. REv. 46 (Dec. 1991). The three most unionized EC countries are Denmark, with 75% of its 
workforce in labor unions, Italy, with 50%, and the UK, with 40%. Most of the other countries 
ranged from one-quarter to one-third unionization, except for France, which has a rate of union 
membership even lower than that of the United States. /d. at 46-52. 
147. Under the NLRA, the employer's duty to bargain, and the attendant duty to supply infor-
mation, apply only to a union representing a majority of the workers in an appropriate bargaining 
unit. NLRA §§ 8(a)(5), 8(d), 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(5), 158(d) (1988). 
148. See BLANPAIN, supra note 2, para. 89 ("'Representation of workers' [in Agreement on 
Social Policy, supra note 2, art. 2 (3)] relates to e.g., works councils, shop stewards, committees of 
health and safety, staff associations, and the like as well as to representation through trade unions 
and at different levels: plant, enterprise, group of enterprises, multinational enterprises included, 
sectoral, national and European."); Bi.ANPAIN, supra note 41, para. 286 (workers' representatives as 
established pursuant to Member States' law). 
149. See SUMMARY REPORT, supra note 115, at 12-13. See generally Christopher Docksey, Em-
ployee Information and Consultation Rights in the Member States of the European Communities, 7 
CoMP. LAB. L. 32 (1985). 
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sharper contrast with U.S. labor policy. Absent a collective bargaining 
agreement, under U.S. law, if a business is sold to another employer, the 
new employer is usually held to be under no obligation to accept the 
individual labor contract of a worker, express or implied. 150 The pur-
chaser, or "successor" employer is free not to hire the predecessors' em-
ployees, 151 and free to offer employment on terms entirely different from 
those provided by the predecessor. Only if the successor voluntarily "as-
sumes" the contract do the individual workers' employment rights re-
main unaltered. Moreover, absent an express contractual provision to 
the contrary, the predecessor employer will be viewed as having commit-
ted neither to obtaining the successors' assent to assumption of the con-
tract nor to any promise of continuation of the contract or the terms 
arising thereunder for any particular duration. 
The law relating to successorship as to collective bargaining agree-
ments is substantially identical to that relating to individual agreements. 
Unless the successor company voluntarily assumes the collective bargain-
ing agreement, it is free to disregard it, even if the successor was aware of 
a contractual promise by the predecessor to require assumption of the 
agreement by any successor. The union's remedies for the breach run 
only against the predecessor employer. 152 
Moreover, by its structuring of the sale and of subsequent opera-
tions, the successor can often avoid any duty to recognize and bargain 
with the union. The new operation is a successor only if it is essentially a 
continuation of the earlier business. 153 Assuming that prerequisite is 
met, the employer only owes the union a duty to recognize it and bargain 
with it if it hires a majority of its workforce from among the employees 
who work for its predecessor. 154 While it is illegal for the successor to 
discriminate in its hiring based on union status, 155 including status as a 
I SO. Indeed, in most jurisdictions, the employee is terminable for any reason or no reason, ab-
sent a contract to the contrary, and excepting reasons violative of public policy or statute. See Peter 
Linzer, The Decline of Assent: At-Will Employment as a Case Study of the Breakdown of Private Law 
Theory, 20 GA. L. REv. 323, 335-68 (1986) (summarizing case law developments from many Ameri-
can jurisdictions). An individual employment contract is assumable by the purchaser of a business, 
but under ordinary rules of contract law, would have to be affirmatively assumed by the purchaser 
for the purchaser to be bound. In light of the at-will nature of most employment "contracts," how-
ever, the point seldom arises. 
lSI. Howard Johnson Co. v. Detroit Local Joint Exec. Bd., 417 U.S. 249, 260-62, 264 (1974); 
NLRB v. Burns Int'l Security Servs., Inc., 406 U.S. 272, 288 (1972). 
I 52. Howard Johnson Co., 417 U.S. at 258 n.3. 
153. See Fall River Dyeing & Finishing Corp. v. NLRB, 482 U.S. 27, 36-41 (1987); Burns lnt'l 
Security Servs., 406 U.S. at 272, 280 n.4; Howard Johnson Co., 417 U.S. at 259. 
154. Fall River Dyeing, 482 U.S. at 47; Burns, 406 U.S. at 278-79. Howard Johnson Co., on the 
other hand, relies on cases characterizing successorship as dependent on the proportion of the prede-
cessor's workforce hired by the successor. 
155. National Labor Relations Act § 8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1988). 
HeinOnline -- 68 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 1458 1992-1993
1458 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 68:1427 
member of the union's bargaining unit with the predecessor, 156 many 
successors advertize widely, slash wages and benefits, and generate an 
applicant pool permitting them to hire much less than a majority of their 
workforce from among the ranks of the predecessor's employees while 
rendering it nearly impossible to establish illegal discrimination. 1S7 
Moreover, even if a duty to bargain with the union does attach to the 
successor, the successor is free to bargain from scratch, ignoring previous 
terms and conditions of employment. 158 
The EC directive takes a diametrically opposed position, again 
premised on worker entitlement to continued employment absent good 
justification and on the productivity of involvement of workers' repre-
sentatives in solving difficult social problems stemming from the work-
place. Successor employers must assume, intact, the individual contract 
of the predecessors' employees, 159 as well as any applicable collective 
agreement. 160 New ownership is not grounds for dismissal of workers by 
predecessor or successor employers, although the successor is permitted 
to restructure for economic, technical or organizational reasons and to 
engage in any resulting dismissal of employees. 161 If the business "pre-
serves its autonomy" in the course of the sale, the workers' representa-
tives retain their status as such despite the transfer of ownership. 162 The 
predecessor and successor both have a duty to inform and consult with 
the workers' representatives regarding the effects of the sale on the busi-
156. Fall River Dyeing. 482 U.S. at 40; Howard Johnson Co., 417 U.S. at 262 & n.8; Bums, 406 
U.S. at 280 & n.5. 
157. See Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Labor and the Corporate Structure: Changing Conceptions 
and Emerging Possibilities, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 73, 108-09 (1988) [hereinafter Stone, Labor and the 
Corporate Structure]. See also Fall River Dyeing, 482 U.S. at 41 (successorship largely "rests in the 
hands of the successor. If the new employer makes a conscious decision to maintain generally the 
same business and to hire a majority of its employees from the predecessor, then the bargaining 
obligation of § 8(a)(5) is activated."); Howard Johnson Co., 417 U.S. at 269 ("The effect [of the 
successorship rule] is to allow any new employer to determine for himself whether he will be bound 
by the simple expedient of arranging for the termination of all of the prior employer's personnel."). 
For more extended discussion of the successorship rules and their practical application, see gener-
ally, Wilbur Daniels & Seth Kupferberg, Sale of Assets, Mergers and Acquisitions: A Union View, in 
LABOR LAW AND BUSINESS CHANGE, supra note 105, at 185, 191-99; Marvin Dicker, Sale of Assets, 
Mergers and Acquisitions: A Management View, in LABOR LAW AND BUSINESS CHANGE, supra note 
105, at 169-74; Samuel Estreicher, Successorship Obligations, in LABOR LAw AND BUSINESS 
CHANGE, supra note 105, at 63; Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Book Review: The Future of Collective 
Bargaining: A Review Essay, 58 CINCINNATI L. REV. 477 (1989) [hereinafter Stone, Book Review] 
158. Burns, 406 U.S. at 294, quoted in Fall River, 482 U.S. at 40. 
159. Council Directive 77/187, art. 3 (1), 1977 O.J. (L 61) 27. See BLANPAIN, supra note 42, 
paras. 296, 309-10. States may elect to limit the duration of this requirement tt> one year after 
completion of the transfer. 
160. Council Directive 77/187, art. 3 (2), 1977 O.J. (L 61) 27. See BLANPAIN, supra note 41, at 
158 'il 296, 164-65 'il'il 309-10. 
161. Council Directive 77/187, art. 4 (I), 1977 O.J. (L 61) 27. See BLANPAIN, supra note 41, 
paras. 313-15. 
162. Council Directive 77/187, art. 6 (I), 1977 O.J. (L 61) 27. 
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ness as well as on terms and conditions of employment. 163 
Moving to matters more clearly in the labor-management relations 
sphere highlights the underlying differences between the European Com-
munity approach and the American system. The United States has a 
labor-management relations system of all-or-nothing representation-
either the workforce has an exclusive collective bargaining agent or the 
assumption is that individual workers deal directly, and individually, 
with the employer. Efforts in non-union businesses to introduce less ad-
versarial forms of labor management cooperation raise the specter of 
company-dominated unions, and pose grave legal issues under Section 
8(a)(2) of the Labor Management Relations Act. 164 
The European Community, in both its existing and proposed legisla-
tion, provides leeway for the diverse models of workplace democracy 
that have grown up indigenously within its Member States. Collective 
bargaining is usually conducted on an industry-wide or sector-wide basis, 
either regionally or nationally, and tends to focus heavily on economic 
issues. In several countries, shop floor level issues are handled, not 
through the trade union/collective bargaining system, but through works 
councils. In works council elections, all employees, whether union mem-
bers or not, are eligible to vote for representatives as "citizens" of the 
enterprise. Unions often back slates of candidates, many of whom are 
elected, but organizationally the works councils are entirely separate 
from the trade union structure. Finally, in a few countries, there is an-
other layer of worker representation through election of workers to the 
policy-making supervisory board of the corporation, or through worker 
nomination of independent, but politically acceptable candidates, from 
among whom the corporate supervisory board selects members. 165 
The EC directives take account of the fact that some member coun-
tries have only collective bargaining, some have collective bargaining and 
works councils, and others provide for all three forms of worker partici-
pation in determining their terms and conditions of employment and the 
future of the business for which they work. As noted previously, several 
of the existing directives require Member States to legislatively provide 
for information and consultation with workers' representatives, meaning 
either their collective bargaining representative or works council, de-
pending on the labor relations system in the Member State. The direc-
163. /d. art. 1. 
164. See E1ectromation, Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. No. 163 (1992). 
165. See generally BLANPAIN, supra note 41, paras. 343-50; SUMMARY REPORT, supra note 115, 
at 14; Docksey, supra note 149, at 35-39. 
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tives addressing insolvency, 166 redundancy, 167 and transfer of the 
business168 each impose such an obligation on the employer. In addition, 
the health and safety framework directive imposes such an obligation, 
hence all individual directives enacted pursuant thereto must also include 
provision for participation by the workers' representatives. 169 
This may be contrasted with unsuccessful efforts in the U.S. to enact 
proposed federal legislation mandating joint labor-management health 
and safety committees, 170 and a bill providing for employee representa-
tives to be elected, along with employer representatives, to the boards 
administering private pension plans covering the workers. 171 
The EC has had under consideration for many years, but has failed 
to enact, more far-reaching proposals in three areas: worker representa-
tion in corporate policy decision making processes in Member State cor-
porations; the creation of a European-chartered holding company for 
multi-state enterprises with provisions for similar worker representation, 
information and consultation rights concerning corporate policy; and the 
creation of European-level works councils. 
The Fifth Directive regarding the structure of nationally-chartered 
public limited liability companies, would require Member States to 
choose among four competing models regarding corporate-level worker 
representation: (1) directly elected worker representatives on the corpo-
rate board of supervisors or other governing body with policy-making 
authority and supervisory authority over the top corporate management 
body; (2) selection of new members by the corporate supervisory board 
from a list of independent (non-employee, non-trade unionist) candidates 
nominated separately by shareholders, management and the employee 
works council, with each of those three groups entitled, for cause, to veto 
the selected nominee, subject to review and reversal by a court; (3) repre-
sentation through an enterprise level workers' council, or (4) representa-
tion through alternative systems agreed upon in a collective agreement 
166. Council Directive, 80/987, art. 2 (I), 1980 O.J. (L 283) 23, as amended by Council Direc-
tive 87/164, 1987 O.J. (L 66) I. 
167. Council Directive 75/129, art. I, 1975 O.J. (L 48) 29. 
168. Council Directive 77/187, arts. 3, 5, 6, 1977 O.J. (L 61) 2. See generally BLANPAIN, supra 
note 41, paras. 316-318. 
169. Council Directive 89/391, arts. 10, II, 1989 O.J. (L 183) 5-6. See generally BLANPAIN, 
supra note 41, paras. 272, 274-76, 279, 281. · 
170. H.R. 3160 § 201, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992); S. 1622 § 201, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992). 
For a study addressing voluntarily-instituted joint labor-management occupational safety and health 
committees, see RUTH RUTTENBERG, THE ROLE OF LABOR-MANAGEMENT COMMITTEES IN SAFE-
GUARDING WORKERS SAFETY AND HEALTH (1991). 
171. H.R. 2664, JOist Cong., 1st Sess. (1989). 
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between labor and management. 172 The supervisory organ in these cor-
porate structures has authority over all major forms of capital redeploy-
ment and organizational restructuring which have a substantial impact 
on the nature, location and continued existence of employees' jobs. 173 
Moreover, if the model selected is that of employee participation through 
a worker representation body, that enterprise-level workers' council has 
the right to information and consultation regarding the company's com-
petitive position, financial prospects, and investment plans, of the same 
type provided to members of the corporate governance board. The work-
ers' council must also be consulted in the same sorts of major organiza-
tional changes that require supervisory board approval. If a collectively 
bargained model is selected, the workers' representative is entitled to 
rights similar to those of the worker representation body in the workers' 
council model. 174 Member States are free, in enacting laws implementing 
this directive, to limit the employer's choice of models to fewer than all 
four. 
These, of course, are precisely the sorts of decisions as to which 
American courts and the NLRB have been most reluctant to mandate 
collective bargaining, at least unless the decisions are based substantially 
on labor factors. American legal scholars, although not the NLRB, have 
raised doubts about the legality of experiments in participation of union 
officials in corporate-level affairs through nomination to a seat on the 
corporate board, 175 as well as other efforts at joint worker-management 
decision making on matters of corporate policy. 
There is also pending a proposed Council regulation and accompa-
nying directive which would establish a "European Company," that is, a 
multi-national holding corporation, operating in several EC Member 
States, chartered by the EC, and operating within an EC-established cor-
172. 1983 O.J. (C 240) 2. A detailed discussion may be found in BLANPAIN, supra note 41, 
paras. 338-350. 
173. See BLANPAIN, supra note 41, paras. 340-42. 
174. See id. paras. 346-47. 
175. Helen S. Scott, Union Directors and Fiduciary Duties under State Corporate Law, in LABOR 
LAW AND BUSINESS CHANGE, supra note lOS, at liS (questioning lawfulness under state corporate 
fiduciary duty law); Brian Hamer, Serving Two Masters: Union Representation on Corporate Boards 
of Directors, 81 COLUM. L. REv. 639 (1981); Bennett Abramowitz, Broadening the Board: Labor 
Participation in Corporate Governance, 34 Sw. L.J. 963 (1980); Stone, Labor and the Corporate Struc-
ture, supra note 157, at 126-31, 147-51 (examining doctrine disqualifying union as bargaining agent 
based on conflict of interest because its official holds seat on company's or competitor's board of 
directors). 
Despite its earlier opposition to union representation on corporate boards, the NLRB General 
Counsel declined to issue a complaint regarding the seat on the Chrysler board of directors provided 
to then UAW President Douglas A. Fraser. See Douglas A. Fraser, Worker Participation in Corpo-
rate Government: The U.A. W.-Chrysler Experience, 58 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 949 (1982). 
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porate law framework, avoiding the problems of conflicting national cor-
porate laws. The regulation requires that the management of "each of 
the founder companies shall discuss with its workers' representatives the 
legal, economic and employment implications of the formation of the 
Societas Europaea (SE) or European Company for the employees and 
any measures proposed to deal with them." 176 Moreover, once the SE 
has been established, it must provide for employee participation by 
choosing a system of workers' participation, with roughly the same four 
models, sketched out above in connection with the Fifth Directive, to 
choose from. 177 In transposing the SE directive into their own national 
legislation, Member States are free to restrict the choices of companies 
with registered offices in their state to fewer than all four options; conse-
quently, the site of the registered office of the SE will determine how 
many of the four choices for worker participation are in fact available. 178 
Involvement of the workers is specifically defined in the directive to mean 
their participation "in the supervision and strategic development" of the 
SE. 179 Even the choice of model for employee participation must be 
agreed upon between founding companies' management boards and the 
workers' representatives. 180 
The proposed directive on European works councils is designed to 
ensure that large companies that operate on a multi-Member State scale 
engage in information and consultation with worker representatives re-
garding matters beyond the scope of local level management. It would 
provide for the creation of a multistate workers' representative partner to 
deal with EC-level management. The scope of the proposed information 
and consultation rights is extensive, including information regarding 
probable development of business, prospects for the immediate future, 
the employment situation, probable trends in the industry and for the 
company. The European works council, in tum, is to pass information 
back to local level works councils. Any corporate restructuring proposal 
likely to have serious consequences for employees would have to be the 
176. Proposed Council Regulation, art. 33, 1989 O.J. (C 263) 41, 48. See BLANPAIN, supra note 
41, para. 354. 
177. Proposed Council Directive, art. 3 (3), (4)-(6), 1989 O.J. (C 263) 69, 69-70. See Proposed 
Council Regulation, arts. 63 para. 2, 66 para. 3, 1989 O.J. (C 263) 41, 54. See BLANPAIN, supra note 
41, paras. 354-55. The model for a workers' council is somewhat different and depends on the 
practices within the Member States. See id. para. 356. 
178. Proposed Council Directive, art. 3 (4), (5), 1989 O.J. (C 263) 69, 70. See BLANPAIN, supra 
note 41, para. 355. 
179. Proposed Council Directive, art. 2, 1989 O.J. (C 263) 69. See BLANPAIN, supra note 41, 
para. 355. 
180. Proposed Council Directive, art. 3 (1), 1989 O.J. (C 263) 69. See BLANPAIN, supra note 41, 
para. 357. 
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subject of advance information and consultation, although the final deci-
sion rests with management.181 
These three proposals regarding worker participation in multistate 
employers' strategic decision making evidence the EC's commitment to 
retain and even increase legal requirements for meaningful worker partic-
ipation, as well as the Community's concern about the accelerated pace 
of capital redeployment. The prospects for passage of the European 
works council directive are generally regarded as the brightest among the 
three. The 1992 amendment to the collective redundancies directive, en-
suring its applicability to transnational decision making, is even stronger 
evidence on this point}82 
Beyond the far broader scope of worker representation and consul-
tation regarding the operations of the enterprise contemplated by these 
proposals, lie important and fundamental differences between how most 
Americans view labor-management relations and how many Europeans 
do. The very words "Social Partners," appearing throughout EC Treaty 
law, assume mutual interdependence of management and labor, and mu-
tual recognition of that interdependence. Contrast this with the view of 
the U.S. Supreme Court in First National Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 183 
that Congress, in enacting the NLRA, "had no expectation that the 
elected union representative would become an equal partner in the run-
ning of the business enterprise .... " 184 Therefore, the Court reasoned, 
bargaining should not be mandatory over decisions directly affecting em-
ployees' jobs, but motivated by concerns entirely apart from labor fac-
tors. There is an enormous gap between European and American 
perspectives on this point. 
The proposed employee participation directives pale in significance 
compared to the role of the "social partners" within the European gov-
ernance scheme itself. In the United States, traditionally both manage-
ment and labor are suspicious of government, and vice versa. Only in 
limited circumstances has this country accepted tripartite, labor-manage-
ment-government solutions to problems. 
In the EC, on the other hand, the idea of tripartitism is widely ac-
cepted, and coming into full flower. Under European Community law, 
181. Proposed Counsel Directive, 1991 O.J. (C 39) 10, as amended by 1991 O.J. (C 336) II. 
However, if no agreement can be reached, the management board may unilaterally select the model 
for worker participation in corporate governance. /d. See generally BLANPAIN, supra note 41, pa-
ras. 362-78. 
182. Council Directive 92/56, 1992 O.J. (L 245) 4 (amending Council Directive 75/129 1975, 
O.J. (L 48) 29). 
183. 452 u.s. 666 (1981). 
184. /d. at 676. 
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both prior to, as well as after Maastricht, labor and management were 
represented, along with other social segments such as farmers, on the 
Economic and Social Committee, an EC governmental institution with 
which consultation by other branches of government is mandated before 
certain types of legislation are enacted. 185 In addition, the Single Euro-
pean Act in 1986 added to the EEC Treaty, Article ll8B, which called 
upon the Commission to promote "the social dialogue," meaning EC-
level discussions between EC-level bodies representing respectively man-
agement and labor. The social dialogue in 1991, in tum, produced a joint 
proposal which evolved into the Agreement on Social Policy adopted by 
eleven Member States at Maastricht. 186 Internal changes now in pro-
gress within the Europe-wide employers' and unions' organizations will 
facilitate EC-level joint actions by labor and management. 
Under the Agreement on Social Policy annexed to the Maastricht 
Treaty, the role of the social partners is expanded to the point where they 
potentially may operate as legislators, or in lieu of legislators. First, as to 
any directive adopted under the procedures of the Agreement on Social 
Policy, any Member State may "entrust management and labour, at their 
joint request, with the implementation," provided they accomplish an 
agreement within the time limits imposed by the EC directive. 187 That 
is, the Member State may fulfill its treaty obligation to enact national 
implementing legislation to accomplish the purpose of the directive by 
delegating this function to national, regional or sectoral collective bar-
gaining. The Member State must have in place or adopt legislation to 
make the results of the labor-management agreement binding on all em-
ployers and workers, and not merely those represented, or the Member 
State may enact supplementary legislation to implement the directive as 
to workers otherwise left out of the scope of coverage. 188 
Second, in fulfilling its obligation to "promot[e] the consultation of 
management and labour at Community level and ... to facilitate their 
dialogue by ensuring balanced support for the parties," 189 the Commis-
sion, "before submitting proposals in the social policy field, shall consult 
management and labour on the direction" of action it is proposing. 190 If 
it proceeds with action, the Commission is to consult the social partners 
on the content of the proposal. The social partners may render an opin-
185. See BLANPAIN, supra note 41, para. 38. 
186. The text of the UNICE, the ETUC, and CEEP joint Proposal of the draft Treaty for Euro-
pean Political Union may be found as Annex II to BLANPAIN, supra note 2, at 80-81. 
187. Agreement on Social Policy, supra note 2, art. 2 (4). 
188. /d. 
189. /d. art. 3 (1). 
190. /d. art. 3 (2). 
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ion or recommendation on the Commission's proposed directive. 191 
Thereafter, the usual legislative process is followed by the Council. 
In lieu of rendering an opinion leading to possible legislation, how-
ever, the social partners may invoke the Article 4 process of attempting, 
for up to nine months, to reach an EC collective agreement covering the 
matter. 192 Such an agreement may then be presented to the Council for 
its adoption, which renders the contents binding EC law. Alternatively, 
the social partners may have their collective agreement implemented 
through the national-level procedures, either through legislative transpo-
sition at the Member State level, or through national-level collective 
bargaining. 193 
In effect, the Social Agreement recognizes the social partners as a 
branch of government, delegating to them partial legislative powers. The 
idea that as to labor-management issues, employer councils and unions 
or workers' councils are more democratically representative of the con-
cerned parties-and better situated than governmental actors to enact 
regulation governing the employment relationship-is one alien to the 
American governmental process, despite the lip service paid to minimiz-
ing governmental intrusion into labor matters. The EC concept of "sub-
sidiarity" is being interpreted to delegate regulatory authority as to 
conditions of employment to the social partners, as the most appropriate 
decision-maker, rather than to Member States or regional governmental 
bodies. 
A final, dramatic difference, related to the social partnership notion, 
is the EC's commitment to social cohesion. A useful comparison is the 
American Equal Pay Act, which was designed to eliminate discrimina-
tion without injuring male workers. The statute provides that denials of 
equal pay on the basis of sex may only be remedied by raising women's 
wages to the level of men's, never by lowering the men to the women's 
level, nor by equalizing somewhere in the middle. 194 
In attempting to equalize disparate standards of living, wages, hours 
and working conditions among the EC Member States, the Community 
has always operated on this principle, attempting to harmonize upwards, 
to the extent possible. In Article 117 of the original Treaty of Rome, in 
language carried forward unaltered to the present EC Treaty, the Mem-
ber States agree "to promote improvement of the living and working con-
ditions of labor so as to permit the equalization of such conditions in an 
191. /d. art. 3 (3). 
192. /d. art. 3 (4). 
193. /d. art. 4 (2). 
194. See § 3(d)(1) of the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(l) (1988). 
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upward direction. 195 The Member States rely on more than the market 
forces of a single unified market to achieve "harmonization of social sys-
tems, but also [on] the procedures provided for under this Treaty and ... 
the approximation of legislative and administrative provisions." 196 The 
EC provides for a series of "social cohesion" funds intended to help un-
derdeveloped Member States and regions catch up with the standards of 
the rest of the Community. In devising social policy, the EC approach is 
to avoid mandating such high standards that the competitive labor ad-
vantage of the lower labor cost states is entirely eliminated, while ensur-
ing a gradual improvement in their labor standards to the level of the 
Community norm. There have always been those who advocated accom-
plishing convergence of Member States' living and working standards 
through market forces alone, but they have consistently compromised 
with those advocating the use of EC legislation to limit the damage to 
Member States with higher standards. This ensures continued commit-
ment to the Community, while gradually raising the level of those at the 
bottom. 
The Community is committed to avoiding what they call "social 
dumping." In the United States, the analogous North-South migration 
of plants and competition between states for the least common denomi-
nator in labor standards, hence labor costs, has been labelled the "race to 
the bottom." As the United States government attempts to build a com-
mon market with Canada and Mexico, it is content, by and large, to let 
market forces have their way, predictably leading to convergence of liv-
ing standards and working conditions somewhere below the present level 
in both Canada and the United States. No combined governance struc-
ture of any substantial sort was originally contemplated by the treaty 
negotiators, except one directly focused on trade disputes. 197 
At the same time, the European Community is expanding to incor-
porate EFf A countries, and, eventually, some of the central European 
states, maintaining its efforts at social cohesion through managed, rather 
than purely market-driven forces. The Community has recognized that 
creating a common market, without common representative governance 
structures and common social policy, dooms efforts at managed conver-
gence of living and labor standards to failure, leaving them at the mercy 
of market forces. The Agreement on Social Policy is a response to that 
195. TREATY OF ROME, art. 117; EC Treaty, art. 117. 
196. TREATY OF ROME, art. 117; EC Treaty, art. 117. 
197. The Clinton administration, however, may have other ideas, as it has announced plans to 
negotiate a North-America-wide procedure for enforcing at least some aspects of proposed side 
agreements to NAFf A addressing environmental and labor standards. 
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recognition, as is the EC's effort to chart out a path for full membership, 
with democratic participation rights in Community decisions, for coun-
tries now bound to the results of EC decisions as part of its single market 
under association agreements, but lacking full input into the EC legisla-
tive process. The United States could learn a great deal from studying 
the European Community example. 
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